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INTRODUCTION 
The following synopsis of Massachusetts divorce practice and 
procedure is intended to be a capsulization of what is rapidly be­
coming a very complex part of the law. Such brevity must, of 
necessity, omit substantial areas which are treated at great length 
in other texts. 1 To some people, this article may appear to be an 
oversimplification of some very complex problems. Nevertheless, 
errors are consistently made in divorce proceedings by inexperi­
enced lawyers, or by laypersons who choose pro se representation 
after only a brief familiarization process. Often these errors could 
easily be avoided with a little pretrial planning. Hopefully, this 
article will be an aid to the busy practitioners in this area and en­
able them to obtain the best results for their clients. In. addition, 
the general public may find the contents helpful in preparing for 
possible future domestic relation encounters-hopefully with the 
advice and guidance of their lawyers. 
The following will be a guide and reference to the major areas 
of Massachusetts divorce law, supplemented by a review of re­
ported decisions. Beginning with a brief discussion of the basics of 
1. See generally G. McLELLAN, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY LAW 
(1978); 1-3 J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE (1967 & Supp. 1976); Freedman, 
ABC's of Massachusetts Divorce Practice and Procedure: Revised January 1, 1977, 
21 B.B.J., January 1977, at 6. 
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jurisdiction and venue, the article proceeds into the area of motion 
practice and considers some of the more common forms of motions 
used by family law practitioners. Discussion will then focus upon 
permissible grounds for a divorce action. Next, some of the com­
mon difficulties encountered in the presentation of an uncontested 
divorce will be considered, along with problems in contested ac­
tions. The recently enacted statute affecting alimony and property 
transfer will then be examined in detail, and a few comments will 
be made on general tax implications. Finally, the possible effects of 
the recent court reorganization bill and the new statute for protec­
tion of persons suffering abuse will be outlined. 
This article does not seek to cover comprehensively all prob­
lems that arise in divorce proceedings. Rather, its purpose is to 
highlight some of the more commonly encountered, and often eas­
ily avoided, difficulties. This foundation should allow for a more 
detailed analysis of these problems as they arise and facilitate their 
successful resolution. 
1. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
A. Divorce 
Jurisdiction in divorce cases is neither wholly in rem nor 
wholly in personam but is based on domicile. Jurisdiction may be 
in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam. Jurisdiction in rem in di­
vorce proceedings is an action against the marital res and results in 
a dissolution of the marital bonds only. Jurisdiction quasi in rem 
may be a proceeding involving primarily the marital res but, in 
addition, is a proceeding against property located within the state. 
Jurisdiction in personam is obtained by virtue of personal service, 
acceptance of service, or a proceeding under the long-arm statute. 
The jurisdictional statutes2 require that the plaintiff live in 
Massachusetts for one year if the alleged cause for divorce has oc­
curred outside of Massachusetts. If the acts allegedly constituting 
the cause for divorce occurred within Massachusetts, the plaintiff 
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, §§ 4-5 (West Supp. 1978) set forth the Mas­
sachusetts residency requirements relating to divorce. See Fiorentino v. Probate 
Court, 365 Mass. 13,310 N.E.2d 112 (1974). This case involved a constitutional chal­
lenge to the old two-year statutory residency requirement for the filing of a com­
plaint for divorce. The court struck down the requirement as violative of the equal 
protection clause. The court was in favor of what it considered to be the more pre­
cise and less burdensome alternative of case-by-case judicial determination of 
domicile. 
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must be domiciled here when the action is started. Generally, the 
plaintiff in a divorce case has the initial burden of proving domicile 
in order to establish jurisdiction. 3 Once established, however, the 
state courts may exercise divorce jurisdiction based solely on the 
domicile of the plaintiff even if the defendant neither appears nor 
is personally served and even though the parties never resided as 
husband and wife in the forum state. 4 The determination of 
domicile is basically a question of fact. Many highly relevant 
criteria bear on this determination. Any evidence indicating an in­
tention to establish roots is considered material; length of residence 
is only one relevant consideration. 5 
B. Custody 
In a case involving the custody of minor children, generally 
jurisdiction is in the state where the child is residing. 6 Massachu­
setts courts will usually first determine whether any complaints are 
pending in any other jurisdiction. If there are pending actions for 
custody in another jurisdiction, Massachusetts courts will be reluc­
tant to decide any questions involving custody of minor children. 
This is particularly true when one of the parents has "snatched" the 
children from the other parent and brought them into Massachu­
setts. Whether Massachusetts will give full faith and credit to a 
sister state's judgment affecting custody of a child will not override 
the best interests of a child residing within the commonwealth. 7 
3. [d. at 22, 310 N.E.2d at 119. See also Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 327 Mass. 631, 100 N .E.2d 370 (1951). 
4. Fiorentino v. Probate Court, 365 Mass. 13,310 N.E.2d 112 (1974). 
5. [d. at 22,310 N.E.2d at 119. See Comment, The Problem of the "Newcomer's 
Divorce," 30 MD. L. REV. 367, 380 n.U3 (1970). The Fiorentino court stated that 
other factors which may be considered include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) Whether the plaintiff has a Massachusetts drivers license and automobile registra­
tion; (2) whether he or she has purchased a home or has leased an apartment and the 
term of any lease; (3) whether any children have been brought to live in Massachu­
setts; (4) whether permanent employment has been obtained in Massachusetts; and 
(5) whether there is evidence of abandonment of previous domicile. Fiorentino v. 
Probate Court, 365 Mass. 13,23 n.12, 310 N.E.2d 112, 119 n.12 (1974). 
6. This general rule has been modified by the new long-arm statute. See notes 
9-13 infra and accompanying text. The amendment of the long-arm statute in 1976 
allows Massachusetts courts to take jurisdiction over child custody cases, even if both 
the parent-defendant and the child are residents outside the commonwealth. The 
following requirements must be met: (1) The plaintiff must be a Massachusetts resi­
dent; and (2) both spouses must have been domiciled here for·one year :of the two 
years immediately preceding the action. It is not necessary for the child ever to have 
lived in Massachusetts. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3(g) (West Supp. 1978). 
7. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1978). In proceedings 
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However, the presence of the child in the state merely because of 
a visit is not considered a residence which allows such jurisdiction. 
C. Long-Arm Statute 
Long-arm statutes are used in every state to acquire in per­
sonam jurisdiction over a defendant who is not a resident of that 
state and may never physically enter the state. The basis of such 
jurisdiction is some contact by the individual with the state in 
which the suit is brought. 8 
The 1976 Massachusetts Legislature amended the long-arm 
statute. 9 It substantially expanded the jUrisdiction of a probate 
court over alimony, support, custody, modification of judgments, 
and other disputes by giving the court in personam jurisdiction 
over nonresident defendants in certain instances. 1o In addition, 
the law suit may extend to property settlement orders relating to 
the marriage. Under the statute, for example, a nonresident de-
dealing with the custody of minor children, the welfare of the children is the govern­
ing consideration. Smith v. Smith, 361 Mass. 855, 279 N.E.2d 693 (1972); Masters v. 
Craddock, 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 784,351 N.E.2d 217. 
8. As a general rule, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a state court over a 
nonresident defendant depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the de­
fendant that the action has been brought and a sufficient connection between the 
defendant and the forum state so as to make it fair to require defense of the action in 
the forum. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1950). 
The United States Supreme Court has recently applied this principle in Kulko v. 
Superior Court of Cal., 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978). That case involved a divorced mother's 
action in a California court to recognize a foreign divorce judgment and to modifY 
the judgment with respect to custody rights and child support obligations. The di­
vorced husband, a New York resident, defended on the ground that the California 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Supreme Court held that where the 
two spouses, both of whom were originally New York domiciliaries, had for reasons 
of convenience married in California and thereafter spent their entire married life in 
New York, the California marriage by itself could not support the California court's 
exercise of jurisdiction over the spouse who remained a New York resident. 
Likewise, the divorced father's aquiescence to his daughter's desire to live with her 
mother in California was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the divorced father in 
California courts. The Court stated that the minimum contacts test "is not susceptible 
of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to deter­
mine whether the requisite 'affiliating circumstances' are present." Id. at 1697. The 
Court concluded, "[T]he mere act of sending a child to California to live with her 
mother is not a commercial act and connotes no intent to obtain nor expectancy of 
receiving a corresponding benefit in the state that would make fair the assertion of 
that State's judicial jurisdiction." Id. at 1702. 
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West Supp. 1978), as amended by 
1976 Mass. Acts ch. 435. 
10. Id. 
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fendant having been served by one of the methods prescribed by 
the statutell may be ordered to convey his or her interest in the 
marital domicile. 
In order to use the long-arm statute in the probate court, all of 
the following conditions must be met: (1) The parties must be legal­
ly married, (2) they must have maintained a domicile in the state for 
at least one of the two years immediately preceding commence­
ment of the action, and (3) the plaintiff must still reside in Massa­
chusetts. 12 The long-arm statute is applicable to separate support 
proceedings in the same manner as in proceedings for divorce. 
Once the long-arm statute applies, the wrongs complained of 
may be remedied (1) to the extent that there is property in the 
state to satisfy the judgment, (2) by obtaining a money judgment 
which can subsequently be sued upon in another jurisdiction with­
out again proving the merits of one's case, or (3) by utilization of 
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 13 
D. Venue 
The Massachusetts venue statute14 provides that the county 
where one of the parties lives is the proper county in which to 
bring the action. If, however, one of the parties still resides in the 
county where the parties last lived together as husband and wife, 
the action must be brought in that county. The court having juris­
diction may, in its discretion, transfer such action to another 
county in the case of hardship or inconvenience to either party. 
11. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 223A, § 6(a) (West Supp. 1978) prescribes five 
methods of service outside Massachusetts. These include (1) personal delivery, (2) 
any manner prescribed by the state in which the defendant resides, (3) any form of 
mail, signed receipt requested, (4) as directed by the foreign authority in response to 
a letter rogatory, and (5) as directed by the court. 
12. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3(g) (West Supp. 1978). See note 6 
supra. 
13. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 273A, §§ 1-17 (West Supp. 1978). The purpose 
of the UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT is to provide an effec­
tive procedure by which one state can compel performance by one under a duty to 
support dependents in another state. The court has the power to make a valid order, 
prospective in operation, based upon the respondent's duty to support his or her 
children in the foreign state. Phillips v. Phillips, 366 Mass. 561, 146 N.E.2d 919 
(1958). Proceedings under the Uniform Act are civil rather than criminal in nature. 
[d.; Souza v. Kokoszka, 36 Mass. App. Dec. 199 (1965). For a discussion of the ob­
taining of jurisdiction over a nonresident parent in filiation or support proceedings, 
see Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 708 (1977). 
14. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 6 (West Supp. 1978). There are 14 coun­
ty probate courts in which an action of divorce may be brought. It should be noted 
that a similar venue situation is present in an action for separate support. The ap­
plicable statute is MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § 34 (West Supp. 1978). 
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E. Required Separation Period Prior to Divorce 
In a divorce action the parties must be living apart for thirty 
days prior to the commencement of the action, and they must so 
certify on the complaint. 15 The statute also provides that the court 
may, after a hearing ex parte, waive this requirement. 
If the parties desire a waiver of this requirement, some Massa­
chusetts courts will sign a thirty-day waiver as a matter of course 
without a hearing, ex parte, or otherwise. 16 Other courts require a 
motion and an actual hearing to waive the thirty-day require­
ment. 17 
II. MOTION PRACTICE 
A motion for temporary order, which may be for support or 
custody, and a motion to vacate, used to force one spouse to leave 
the marital home, are the most common forms of motion used by 
family law practitioners. As a general rule, the court may hear 
motions and other interlocutory matters in chambers or in open 
court at such times and upon such notice as may be otherwise re­
quired by law. IS The moving party must serve the opponent with a 
copy of the motion at least three days prior to the hearing if service 
is by hand, and six days if by mail. 19 
The court, in its discretion, for good cause shown, with or 
without a motion or notice to the opponent, may order the time 
period enlarged if a request is made prior to the expiration of the 
15. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 68 (West Supp. 1978). 
16. It should be noted that some judges refuse to sign a waiver if the parties 
are still living together. If the spouses are unable to agree on who should leave the 
premises, the plaintiff's lawyer should first serve the defendant with a notice to va­
cate under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 348 (West Supp. 1978), and then re­
quest the 3D-day waiver. 
17. If the divorce action is brought by the plaintiff-spouse prior to the expira­
tion of 30 days from the time the parties began to live apart, and the defendant­
spouse fails to object by pleadings or otherwise, the defendant-spouse waives such 
objection. The objection is not jurisdictional, nor does it go to the merits of the case. 
Thus, the objection is waived if not timely made. Phillips v. Phillips, 1975 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 664, 326 N.E.2d 729, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1022 (1975). 
18. MASS. SuPP. R. PROB. CT. 101. This rule restates MASS. ?ROB. CT. R. 15 as 
amended by the probate judges. Supplemental rules of probate court are promul­
gated pursuant to MASS. R. Cry. P. 83. 
19. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 6(d) provides that in the event of notice being 
served by mail, three days are added to the prescribed time period. 
In computing any period of time for service of a motion one should note that the 
day of the act, event, or default after which the deSignated period of time begins to 
run is not included. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 6(a). The last day of the period is in­
cluded unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which case the period 
runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. 
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period originally prescribed. 20 Even after the expiration of the 
period, the court may permit the act to be done where the failure 
to act was the result of excusable neglect. 21 Of course the parties, 
by agreement, may waive, extend, or reduce any of the required 
notices. 
A. Temporary Orders for Support or Custody 
Pending the outcome of an action for divorce, either of the 
parties may seek temporary orders relative to the care, custody, 
and support of their minor children. 22 Alimony and support orders 
awarded pendente lite (during the pendency of the action) are used 
to aid the wife or husband during the period before the hearing of 
the divorce action on the merits. 23 By definition, this is not a final 
order. As a practical matter, however, if the parties have not al­
tered their financial circumstances, the final judgment will prob­
ably award the same amount as the temporary order. Efforts should 
be made, therefore, to present a full and fair financial picture to 
the court so that the order will be equitable in view of all the 
circumstances. 24 Financial statements under oath must be pre­
20. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 6(b). 
21. Id. 
22. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 19 (West Supp. 1978). See generally 
Note, Custody Awards of Minors, 6 NEW ENG. L. REV. 201 (1971). 
23. Although there is some early authority denying the power of the court to 
award alimony pendente lite in an action for divorce, it is now generally the practice 
in the United States for a court, upon application by the wife, to make an allowance 
for her support during the pendency of the suit if she is without separate means and 
the husband is able to support her. S. v. A., 118 N.J. Super. 69,285 A.2d 588 (Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1972); Lerner v. Lerner, 21 App. Div. 2d 861, 251 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1964). 
The right to alimony pendente lite is not absolute. As with any award of alimony, the 
spouse must establish that he or she comes within the provisions of the law which 
entitle him or her to the award. House v. House, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1964, 330 
N.E.2d 152; Gosselin v. Gosselin, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 294 N.E.2d 555 (1973). See 
Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 332 A.2d 78 (1973) (statute providing alimony pen­
dente lite held to be constitutional even though similarly situated females could not 
be compelled to pay temporary alimony); Salito v. Salito, 107 N.H. 77, 217 A.2d 181 
(1966) (statute which authorizes the court to make temporary allowances for support 
has been given a limited construction). In Saraceno v. Saraceno, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
294, 341 N.E.2d 261, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
alimony statute was not unconstitutional as discriminating against husbands. It 
should be noted that the statute, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 34, has been 
amended by 1974 Mass. Acts ch. 565, to eliminate any possible discrimination in 
granting alimony. See notes 161-65 infra and accompanying text. 
24. Whether or not a temporary award will be made depends upon the condi­
tion of the parties at the time the application for relief is made, not on their situation 
at the time the suit was instituted. See Dejoie v. Dejoie, 6 Ill. App. 3d 381, 286 
N.E.2d 38 (1972) (award of temporary alimony rests within the discretion of trial 
285 1978] MASSACHUSETTS DIVORCE 
sented as well as all other supportive financial documents. 25 Where 
the defendant owns a business, it is impossible for a judge to accu­
rately award alimony and support payments unless the balance 
sheets are produced for the fiscal year ending at the time nearest 
the date of the hearing. Often, there will not be enough money to 
satisfy the demands of the parties and children. No order for 
alimony and support may be entered until the defendant has been 
personally served in the basic action and, in addition, properly 
served with a notice of motion. 
When filing a motion for temporary custody, the moving 
party, in many cases, should simultaneously file a motion for inves­
tigation by the Family Service Office. 26 As a general rule, the 
status quo will be maintained at a temporary custody hearing pend­
ing: (1) An investigation and report by the Family Service Office, 
or (2) a hearing on the merits of the divorce complaint. Only if the 
health and welfare of the children is in present danger will the 
court, in the usual case, allow a full hearing on the question of 
temporary custodial rights. 27 It is against the best interest of the 
child to temporarily change custody when, after a hearing on the 
merits, it is possible to reverse the custody rights again. 28 
court and is dependent on current circumstances of the parties). Accord, Gasperini 
v. Gasperini, 57 Ill. App. 3d 578,373 N.E.2d 576 (1978); Rabin v. Rabin, 57 Ill. App. 
2d 193,206 N.E.2d 850 (1965). 
25. MASS. SUPP. R. PROB. CT. 40l. The financial statement must be filed at the 
same time the request for a temporary order is made. Either party in a contested 
matter may request the other party, upon 48 hours notice, to furnish a financial 
statement to the court with a copy to the requesting party. 
Financial statements submitted to the court at the time of a hearing on a tempo­
rary motion for temporary alimony and support are not included among the papers in 
the case because this information is not available to the public. Thus, an attorney 
who submits a financial statement to the judge at a hearing on a motion for tempo­
rary support should not assume that the judge will have these statements at the time 
of the hearing on the merits. 
26. The probation department and the probation officers of the probate court 
are generally called Family Service Officers. They make investigations and file re­
ports whenever directed to do so by the court. When filed, their reports are entitled 
to some weight in the judge's deliberations, but they are by no means conclusive. 
See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, §§ 83, 85A, 85B (West Supp. 1978). 
27. The basic issues at this stage are what is best for the interest and welfare of 
the minor children and what protection they may need until a full hearing on the 
merits. At that time, the court hears all the evidence and can make permanent orders. 
See 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 1988 (1967). There is no absolute 
rule; custody is not a prize to be awarded to the prevailing party. Clifford v. Clifford, 
354 Mass. 545, 238 N.E.2d 522 (1968). 
28. The probate court may revise and alter a decree for custody "as the circum­
stances of the parents and the benefit of the children may require." MASS. GEN. 
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B. Motion to Vacate The Marital Home 
Upon commencement of an action for divorce, or during the 
pendency thereof, any court having jurisdiction may order the hus­
band or wife to vacate the marital home for a period of time not 
exceeding ninety days.29 The moving party has the burden to es­
tablish "a substantial likelihood of immediate danger to his or her 
health, safety or welfare or to that of such minor children from the 
opposing party . . . . "30 The court will not usually take such an 
extraordinary measure as to remove a spouse from the home with­
out the moving party clearly sustaining this burden of proof. 31 
If the moving party can establish this substantial likelihood of 
immediate danger, the court may enter a temporary order without 
notice to the opposing party. However, the party must be notified 
immediately and given an opportunity within five days to be heard 
on the question of continuing the temporary order. Although the 
maximum period that a court may order a party to vacate is ninety 
days at anyone time, additional orders may be made for such 
period of time as the court deems necessary. 
III. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 
Although there are several grounds for divorce in Massachu­
setts,32 the most common is cruel and abusive treatment. This is 
true despite the fact that desertion and irretrievable breakdown are 
the easiest grounds to prove. In the future, the most common 
ground for divorce will probably be irretrievable breakdown be-
LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West Supp. 1978). Generally, a change in custody will not 
be ordered unless there has been some change in circumstances since the original 
decree for custody. It has been held that "[wlhether such a change shall be ordered 
is a matter 'peculiarly within the province of the judge, who observed the witnesses, 
among whom were both parents.''' Palmer v. Palmer, 357 Mass. 764, 764, 256 
N.E.2d 446, 447 (1970) (quoting Grandell v. Short, 317 Mass. 605, 608, 59 N.E.2d 
274, 276 (1945)). 
29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34B (West Supp. 1978). This same rule 
applies in an action for nullity of marriage and in an action for separate support or 
maintainance. 
30. [d. 
31. In Dee v. Dee, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 320, 296 N.E.2d 521 (1973), the Massachu­
setts Appellate Court reversed a probate court order which had, in an action for 
separate support, required the husband to vacate the marital home. It held that the 
probate court did not have the power under § 34B to order the husband to vacate the 
marital home held in a tenancy by the entirety. 
32. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (West Supp. 1978) lists the following 
permissible grounds for divorce: Adultry, impotency, desertion, gross and confirmed 
habits of intoxication, cruel and abusive treatment, failure to provide support and 
maintenance, and irretrievable breakdown. 
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cause recent legislation has reduced the waiting period substan­
tially.33 
A. Cruel and Abusive Treatment 
Virtually any act or series of acts committed by a defendant 
against his or her spouse may give rise to cruel and abusive treat­
ment if those acts are committed intentionally by the defendant in 
such a way as to humiliate, demean, or otherwise affect the health 
of the plaintiff, or to create a reasonable apprehension in the plain­
tiff that his or her health may be impaired.34 If the defendant's 
actions are calculated to cause the plaintiff mental or physical 
harm, it is not necessary, before the cause of action arises, to have 
the plaintiff sustain that harm. 35 It is enough that the defendant's 
actions create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the plain­
tiff that mental or physical harm will result. 36 Many times lawyers 
33. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, §§ lA, IB (West Supp. 1978). See generally 
Freedman, Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage: An Additional Ground for Di­
vorce, 20 B.B.}., January 1976, at 3. 
34. Yee v. Yee, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 897, 319 N.E.2d 743 (1974). There the court 
held that "it is not necessary to prove that the [defendant] had a malevolent intent to 
cause physical injury to the body or to the health of the [plaintiff] ...." Id. at 897, 
319 N.E.2d at 744. Cruel and abusive treatment was sufficiently established by 
showing that such injury was the natural consequence of the conduct, and that harm 
resulted or was reasonably likely to follow the acts of the defendant. In Collis v. 
Collis, 355 Mass. 25, 242 N.E.2d 423 (1968), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed the denial of a husband's request for divorce. It held that the action 
was properly dismissed where the court had found that the husband was the aggres­
sor in the situation which gave rise to his claim of cruel and abusive treatment. It 
viewed the wife's conduct as principally preventive in nature, and not done with 
malicious intent or with the desire to injure the husband. 
Connecticut courts adopt a different view on the necessary intent with which the 
acts constituting cruel and abusive treatment must be performed. In Sarafin v. Sara­
fin, 28 Conn. Supp. 24, 247 A.2d 500 (1968), a divorce action was brought on the 
grounds of alleged intolerable cruelty. It was held that intolerable cruelty requires 
not only proof of acts of cruelty, but proof that in their cumulative effect they are 
intolerable in the sense of rendering continuance of the marital relation unbearable. 
Under Connecticut law, it must be determined that the conduct of the defendant was 
either intended by him or her to be cruel or was of such a character that the trial 
court may reasonably infer an intent to be cruel. 
35. Silverman v. Silverman, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 317, 360 N.E.2d 902. 
In dismissing the husband's complaint for divorce, the court held that conduct short 
of physical cruelty can constitute cruel and abusive treatment. "Cruelty 'is broad 
enough to include mere words, if they tend . . . to wound the feelings to such a 
degree as to affect the health of the party, or create a reasonable apprehension that it 
may be affected ... .' " Id. at 317, 360 N.E.2d at 903. This complaint was dismissed, 
however, because the record did not establish that damage to the husband's health 
was the natural consequence of the wife's conduct. 
36. Silverman v. Silverman, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 317, 360 N.E.2d 902; 
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allege cruel and abusive treatment but their witness testifies to 
facts indicating another ground for divorce. Frequently, lawyers as­
sume that such testimony is sufficient for a judge to grant the di­
vorce on grounds of cruel and abusive treatment. However, to be 
cruel and abusive treatment, an act constituting any other ground 
must be committed in such a way as to intentionally cause the 
plaintiff physical or mental harm. 37 
Similarly, a defendant's conduct, no matter how heinous or 
cruel and no matter how abusive it is, will not give rise to a di­
vorce on grounds of cruel and abusive treatment unless that con­
duct was committed by the defendant in such a way as to know­
ingly cause the plaintiff mental or physical harm. If the acts were 
committed while .the defendant was insane, for example, they 
would not be considered cruel and abusive treatment. 38 
Yee v. Yee, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 897, 319 N.E.2d 743 (1974). 
Whether the defendant-spouse's conduct was sufficient to create this reasonable 
apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff is a question of fact that must be deter­
mined from the various circumstances of the case. In Ober v. Ober, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 
32,294 N.E.2d 449 (1973), the plaintiff's wife accused him of having an affair with a 
female client. She repeated the accusation to her friends, and persisted in the ac­
cusation publicly and privately over a three-year period until her husband finally left 
her. The accusations had no basis in fact. The court found that the wife's baseless 
accusations of infidelity caused the husband to be upset and angry. The court also 
found it reasonably likely that injury to the husband's health would follow as a 
natural consequence of the wife's conduct. This evidence was deemed sufficient to 
sustain an award of divorce to the husband on the grounds of cruel and abusive 
treatment. Similarly, in Manning v. Manning, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 326, 360 
N.E.2d 903, the court found that the wife's conduct in making numerous telephone 
calls to the husband at work, her threats to speak to his employer, her quarreling 
with him over money, and her throwing of his clothes onto the lawn constituted a 
pattern of behavior likely to cause him harm. This was held sufficient to justify a 
divorce on the grounds of cruel and abusive treatment. Compare Lynch v. Lynch, 1 
Mass. App. Ct. 589, 304 N.E.2d 445 (1973), in which the wife's allegedly cruel and 
abusive treatment consisted only of two isolated instances. The first was an exchange 
of epithets in the husband's barber shop where the wife had gone to ask him for 
money for support; the second occurred two years later when she called him a 
"faker" after a court hearing. This evidence was deemed insufficient to entitle the 
husband to a divorce on the grounds of cruel and abusive treatment. See Carrol v. 
Carrol, 358 Mass. 809, 265 N.E.2d 383 (1970). 
37. Yee v. Yee, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 897, 319 N.E.2d 743 (1974). It is the quality 
rather than the duration of the acts which controls. The act need not be part of a 
continuing course of conduct. Under the proper circumstances, a single act of cruelty 
may constitute sufficient grounds for divorce. See Collis v. Collis, 355 Mass. 25, 242 
N.E.2d 423 (1968). But cf. Ober v. Ober, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 294 N.E.2d 449 (1973) 
(wife's course of conduct over three-year period sufficient to constitute cruel and 
abusive treatment as ground for divorce). 
38. By consensus of American authority, with which Massachusetts law accords, 
a divorce cannot be granted on the grounds of cruel and abusive treatment when the 
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In eliciting testimony to establish this ground for divorce, care 
should be taken to distinguish between mental treatment that is 
cruel and abusive and physical treatment that is cruel and abu­
sive. 39 Either type of conduct may be sufficient to warrant a di­
vorce on grounds of cruel and abusive treatment if committed with 
the proper knowledge and intent. If the plaintiff vividly testifies to. 
abusive physical treatment, it is unconscionable for a lawyer to ask, 
"Did that make you feel nervous and upset, Mrs. Jones? " If acts 
constituting a valid cause for divorce on this ground have occurred, 
any competent lawyer, with a little time and thought, should be 
able to elicit truthful testimony from his or her client sufficient to 
justifY a judgment for divorce on grounds of cruel and abusive 
treatment. There is no need to strain the plaintiff's testimony to fit 
within a particular rigid form. 
There are some limits to the type of conduct sufficient to es­
tablish this ground for divorce. Arguments between the spouses 
alone are insufficient to give rise to a divorce action for cruel and 
abusive treatment. 40 The fact that the defendant is "frequently 
acts complained of were done by an insane person. Rice v. Rice, 332 Mass. 489, 125 
N.E.2d 787 (1955). 
"It is recognized in many jurisdictions that not every type or degree of mental 
illness constitutes the kind of insanity which may be a defense to an action of this 
nature." Cosgrove v. Cosgrove, 351 Mass. 64, 66, 217 N.E.2d 754, 756 (1966). See 
Dochelli v. Dochelli, 125 Conn. 468, 6 A.2d 324 (1939); Hadley v. Hadley, 144 Me. 
127, 65 A.2d 8 (1949); Bryce v. Bryce, 229 Md. 16, 181 A.2d 455 (1962); Jaikins v. 
Jaikins, 370 Mich. 488, 122 N.W.2d 673 (1963); Silvemess v. Silvemess, 270 Minn. 
564,1.34 N.W.2d 901 (1965); Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961). 
See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 144, 151-55 (1951). The underlying principle ap­
pears to be that the defense of insanity will prevail only if the offending spouse was 
incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of his or her acts and was 
unable to restrain himself or herself from committing them. 351 Mass. 64, 217 
N.E.2d 754. 
39. In Massachusetts, the phrase "cruel and abusive treatment" includes both 
physical and mental cruelty. See Reed v. Reed, 340 Mass. 321, 163 N.E.2d 919 (1960) 
(mental cruelty affecting health); LaVigne v. LaVigne, 336 Mass. 377, 145 N.E.2d 
687 (1957) (physical cruelty); Brown v. Brown, 323 Mass. 332, 81 N.E.2d 820 (1948) 
(mental cruelty affecting health). 
40. Lynch v. Lynch, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 589, 304 N.E.2d 445 (1973) (two isolated 
instances of argumentative confrontation between spouses held insufficient grounds). 
Contra, Nowak v. Nowak, 23 Conn. Supp. 495, 497, 185 A.2d 83, 84 (1962), where it 
was stated: 
Incompatibility of personalities is not and has never been a ground for 
divorce in Connecticut. Under our law, married persons are expected to ac­
cept the ordinary vicissitudes of marriage caused by unwise mating, un­
happy situations, unruly tempers and common quarrels or marital wrang­
lings. To constitute intolerable cruelty, the consequences must be serious. 
This rule was reaffirmed in Sarafin v. Sarafin, 28 Conn. Supp. 24, 247 A.2d 500 
(1968). 
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drunk" is insufficient as well if that is the only alleged mistreat­
ment. 41 Additionally, the mere fact that the defendant is absent 
from home frequently also fails to establish cruel and abusive 
treatment. 42 These actions, however, coupled with the further evi­
dence that the defendant committed these acts or omissions know­
ing that they had a detrimental effect on the plaintiff, and affected 
his or her mental or physical health, so as to cause sleeplessness, 
loss of weight, and the like, will give rise to a valid claim of cruel 
and abusive treatment. 43 There is no doubt that in Massachusetts 
some probate judges have taken the attitude that they will not hold 
lawyers strictly to the rigid standards of case law in an uncontested 
divorce action. They may feel that changing times and current so­
cial pressures compel them to set lenient standards for establishing 
cruel and abusive treatment. 
In any event, the enactment of irretrievable breakdown as a 
ground for divorce allows a litigant to obtain a divorce without tes­
timony charging the defendant-spouse with fault. In this way, 
strained testimony in a divorce action can be avoided in situations 
where the facts do not meet current legal standards for cruel and 
abusive treatment. 44 
B. Irretrievable Breakdown 
In 1975, a legislative enactment added irretrievable breakdown 
as an additional ground for divorce in the Commonwealth of Mas­
sachusetts. 45 The statute is divided into two sections, which, in 
essence, divide the ground of irretrievable breakdown into two 
41. Evidence of intoxication of the defendant without malevolent purpose to­
ward the plaintiff does not prove cruel and abusive treatment. Callan v. Callan, 280 
Mass. 37, 181 N.E. 736 (1932). See 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSEITS PRACTICE § 
1730 (1967). 
42. See Carroll v. Carroll, 358 Mass. 809, 265 N.E.2d 383 (1970), where it was 
held that cruel and abusive treatment was not established by evidence that the wife 
had left her husband and gone to her mother's while the husband was ill in bed with 
pneumonia. She returned the following evening and inquired whether he was all 
right but did not enter the house. 
43. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 340 Mass. 321, 163 N.E.2d 919 (1960). Where the wife 
refused to cease kee.ping company with another man despite the husband's re­
monstrances, with the result being that the husband's health deteriorated and he lost 
weight, there was cruel and abusive treatment so as to entitle the husband to a di­
vorce. 
44. There are, of course, many other circumstances which can give rise to cruel 
and abusive treatment as a ground for divorce. For the sake of brevity these have 
been omitted here. See generally 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSEITS PRACTICE §§ 
1721-1745 (1967 & Supp. 1976). 
45. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, §§ lA, IB (West Supp. 1978). 
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separate categories: (1) Where there is no disagreement, and (2) 
where there is a controversy. 
l. Both Parties Agree 
Where both parties agree that an irretrievable breakdown of 
marriage has occurred, and agree on all other facts, section 1A of 
the statute governs. The action under section 1A is commenced by 
the filing of the complaint, affidavit, and separation agreement. The 
complaint should, in addition to stating the cause, contain a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the party bringing 
the action is entitled to relief The party must allege concise and 
legally sufficient facts which constitute an irretrievable breakdown 
of the marriage. In practice, most Massachusetts judges accept the 
complaint where the grounds for divorce are stated without any 
supportive facts. Better practice dictates, however, that the party 
bringing the action allege sufficient facts. 
The affidavit must be signed by both parties and state that an 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage exists. Facts must be set forth 
in the affidavit to inform the court of the reasons why the parties 
believe an irretrievable breakdown exists. The separation agree­
ment must be signed by the parties and sworn to before a notary 
public. If the agreement is not ready at the time of filing, it may 
be filed at the registry of probate within ninety days of filing the 
complaint and affidavit. 
Various counties in Massachusetts differ as to the procedure 
and method of presenting a divorce on the ground of irretrievable 
breakdown. Some judges treat the matter no differently than an 
action for divorce on any other ground. Accordingly, the witness 
takes the stand and testifies to the facts which led to the irretrieva­
ble breakdown. The second spouse may similarly take the stand 
and testify accordingly. Other judges conduct a "bench conference" 
wherein one party testifies to the jurisdictional and venue ele­
ments, the existence of a valid marriage, and the collateral facts 
of the names and ages of the children of the parties. Inquiry is 
made, either by the attorney for one of the parties or by the court, 
as to why the marriage has broken down and whether there is any 
chance of a reconciliation. The separation agreement is explained to 
the parties and examined by the court, the financial statements are 
submitted and reviewed, child custody and visitation rights are ex­
plained in detail, and the matter is concluded on a more or less 
informal basis. 
Both parties should be present at the hearing. To the extent 
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that one of the parties is unrepresented, inquiry should be made as 
to whether he or she understands the agreement, and whether he 
or she concurs in the statement by the other spouse that an irret­
rievable breakdown has occurred and that there is no possibility of 
reconciliation. Equally as important is whether the unrepresented 
spouse understands that the attorney represents the other spouse 
only. 46 
Six months after the approval of the agreement by the court, 
the judgment of divorce nisi is entered. 47 Six months after the 
entry of the judgment of divorce nisi, a judgment of divorce abso­
lute will enter48 if no statement of objections has been filed. 49 
Within the six month period prior to the entry of the judgment of 
divorce nisi, the divorce agreement previously filed with the court 
may be modified by agreement of the parties with the approval of 
the court. A modification complaint must be filed and a substantial 
46. No lawyer can represent both parties to a divorce whether on the ground of 
irretrievable breakdown or any other ground. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON­
SIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 5-15, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A). 
47. A judgment nisi is one which will definitely conclude the defendant's rights 
unless, within the prescribed time, he or she shows cause to set it aside or success­
fully appeals. When a judgment nisi is finally confirmed by the defendant's failure to 
show cause against it, it becomes absolute. 
48. As a general rule, prior to its becoming absolute a judgment nisi may be 
modified by the court in light of a change in circumstances of the parties. For exam­
ple, where a probate court judge found that after entry of a judgment nisi, and before 
the judgment became absolute, the wife openly and with the intention of embarrass­
ing and injuring the husband and his reputation conducted herself in a scandalous 
manner by committing adultery, to the extent that this conduct did in fact affect the 
husband and his ability to carry on his business, it was held that the judge's reduc­
tion of the husband's alimony obligation to the wife was not an abuse of discretion. 
Miller v. Miller, 366 Mass. 846, 314 N.E.2d 443 (1974). For a discussion of judges' 
discretion concerning appropriate reductions of alimony. in the proper circumstances, 
see Surabian v. Surabian, 362 Mass. 342, 285 N.E.2d 909 (1972); Richman v. Rich­
man, 335 Mass. 395, 140 N.E.2d 139 (1957). 
49. During the six-month period after any judgment of divorce nisi, the defen­
dant may file a statement of objections to the judgment becoming absolute. If this 
occurs, the judgment does not become absolute until the objections have been dis­
posed of by the court. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 58(c). See Gailis v. Gailis, 1 Mass. 
App. Ct. 253, 295 N.E.2d 175 (1973). However, in the absence ofa filed statement of 
objections or a stay, the mere pendency of an appeal does not prevent the judgment 
of divorce nisi from becoming absolute. Scholz v. Scholz, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 649, 
324 N.E.2d 617. 
Once the judgment becomes absolute there is no longer any right to appeal from 
the judgment nisi. Sloane v. Sloane, 349 Mass. 318, 208 N.E.2d 211 (1965). However, 
a court of probate retains the power to correct errors in its decrees. It has been held 
that a divorce judgment nisi may be revoked for fraud or mistake even after it has 
become absolute. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 649, 324 N.E.2d 617. 
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change in circumstances must be shown at the time of the hearing. 
Prior to the hearing date of a divorce on the ground of irretrievable 
breakdown, the parties are entitled to temporary orders in the 
same manner as in any other action for divorce. 50 
2. Only One Party Seeks Divorce 
When only one of the parties avers that an irretrievable 
breakdown of marriage exists, and there is no agreement, section 
lB is involved and the matter proceeds as a contested divorce. 
Twelve months must elapse after the filing of the complaint before 
there is a hearing. After the hearing, in the event the court finds 
that an irretrievable breakdown exists and has existed from the 
time the complaint was filed, a judgment of divorce nisi will be 
entered. 51 As part of the judgment of the court, as in judgments 
of divorce on any other grounds, the court will make orders relat­
ing to the custody and support of any minor children and orders 
for alimony in accordance with the statutory provisions for ali­
mony, support, and for the disposition of marital property. 52 In 
those cases involving section lB, as in section lA, the parties may 
bring a motion for temporary orders prior to the hearing on the 
merits. 53 
In the event that an agreement is reached between the parties 
prior to the entry of judgment in a section lB irretrievable break­
down divorce action, the parties may file a motion to amend to 
make it a section lA action. The matter may then proceed under 
that section. 
The statute concerning equitable division of marital property54 
is applicable to a divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, 
except that in a proceeding under section lA the court cannot take 
fault into consideration in determining if the agreement is accept­
able. When there is no agreement and the proceeding is under 
section lB, however, fault may be considered by the court. Finan­
cial statements, of course, must be filed by the parties. 55 
50. See notes 22-31 supra and accompanying text. 
51. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text. 
52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, §§ 28,34 (West Supp. 1978). 
53. See notes 22-31 supra and accompanying text. 
. 54. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1978). This statute is 
discussed at notes 161-77 infra and accompanying text. 
55. See generally Freedman, supra note 33. 
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C. 	 Desertion 
The statutes on desertion56 were revised in June, 1974 to re­
duce the number of years of absence necessary to establish this 
cause for divorce to one year prior to the filing of the complaint. 57 
By virtue of this change, desertion is one of the easiest grounds for 
divorce to prove in Massachusetts. Since recrimination has been 
abolished as a defense, 58 one need only prove that (1) the defen­
dant ceased cohabitation, (2) the cessation of cohabitation has lasted 
for at least one year prior to the filing of the complaint, (3) the 
defendant intended to cease cohabitation, and (4) the defendant 
ceased cohabitation without the consent of the plaintiff. 59 
One of the most common problems involving desertion is the 
husband's relocation of the domicile and the wife's refusal to follow. 
Presently, a wife has a duty to follow her husband's domicile if the 
change is reasonable. Her failure to do so may give rise to an ac­
tion for desertion. 6o What is a reasonable change will be decided in 
the last analysis by the court. Whether the foregoing rubric will 
withstand a constitutional challenge is problematical. 61 
56. 	 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, §§ 1,22 (West Supp. 1978). 
57. Prior to the amendment, an absence of two years was required to establish 
desertion as a ground for divorce. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (West 
1974). 
58. Recrimination is a charge made by an accused person against the accuser. It 
has been defined as a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the 
plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of divorce. Morrison v. Morrison, 38 Idaho 45, 
221 P. 156 (1923). In 1973, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 1 was amended to 
state that in an action for divorce "no defense upon recrimination shall be enter­
tained by the court." 
59. See generally 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE §§ 1661-1683 
(1967). To be a cause for divorce, it is essential that the desertion be without consent 
or justification and with the intent of not returning. A divorce cannot be granted on 
the ground of desertion if the plaintiff-spouse consented to the separation. Cannis­
traro v. Cannistraro, 352 Mass. 65, 223 N.E.2d 692 (1967). Accord, Pempek v. Pem­
pek, 141 Conn. 602, 109 A.2d 238 (1954). 
60. Franklin v. Franklin, 190 Mass. 349, 77 N.E. 48 (1906), held that the refusal 
of the wife to follow her husband to America without other excuse than disinclina­
tion to leave her native land was desertion entitling husband to a divorce. A hus­
band, as the head of the family and legally responsible for its support, has the right 
to choose and establish a domicile for himself and his wife and children. The refusal 
of the wife to stay with him in that domicile without reason is desertion. Martin v. 
Martin, 62 Ill. App. 2d 105,210 N.E.2d 590 (1965) (wife has duty to follow husband 
when he changes residence and failure to do so constitutes desertion as a ground for 
divorce); City of Somerville v. Commonwealth, 313 Mass. 482, 48 N.E.2d 8 (1943) 
(refusal of wife without reasonable cause to follow husband when husband acquires 
a new home constitutes desertion entitling husband to a divorce). 
61. A husband is not guilty of desertion because he fails to follow the wife to a 
new domicile selected by her. Unlike the husband, the wife has generally not been 
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The termination of sexual relations by one spouse may, under 
some circumstances, amount to desertion. 62 More likely, however, 
such conduct would be the basis for an action on grounds of cruel 
and abusive treatment. 63 
If it can be shown that after the defendant's desertion, and 
during the course of the year prior to the filing of the complaint, 
he or she attempted a reconciliation and the plaintiff resisted such 
an attempt and consented to the defendant's living apart, no judg­
ment of divorce for desertion will enter. 64 
viewed as the head of the family, and, thus, not legally responsible for its support. 
Therefore, the wife apparently does not have a similar right to choose and establish a 
domicile for herself and the family. See 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE 
§ 1670 (1967). 
62. An early Massachusetts case held that the mere refusal by a wife of sexual 
intercourse with her husband for five consecutive years, although unjustified by con­
siderations of health or physical disability, was not sufficient alone to support a di­
vorce on the ground of desertion. Southwick v. Southwick, 97 Mass. 327 (1867). In a 
more recent decision, Mancuso v. Mancuso, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 867, 305 N.E.2d 868 
(1974), it was held that where the wife caused the husband to leave home by exclud­
ing him from frequent gatherings with her family and terminating all sexual rela­
tions, and the evidence showed that the wife's conduct was premeditated and delib­
erate, the husband was entitled to a divorce on grounds of desertion. In the Mancuso 
decision the denial of marital intercourse was only one aspect of the marital miscon­
duct which constituted desertion as a ground for divorce. 
Connecticut adopts a similar view and generally holds that refusal of marital 
intercourse is not in itself desertion. Desertion occurs only when the refusal is 
coupled with substantial abandonment of other marital duties. A husband whose wife 
refused to have sexual intercourse during the six years that they lived together was 
not entitled to divorce on the ground of desertion. McCurry v. McCurry, 126 Conn. 
175, 10 A.2d 365 (1939). Other jurisdictions that adopt a similar rule include Il­
linois, Belt v. Belt, 30 III. App. 2d 263, 174 N.E.2d 212 (1961) (denial of sexual 
intercourse by one's spouse is not a cause for divorce and does not justify abandon­
ment of the spouse), and Pennsylvania, Mosher v. Mosher, 149 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 27 
A.2d 448 (1942) (wife's refusal of sexual intercourse with husband is not grounds for 
divorce). 
In contrast, under substantially similar statutes, many appellate courts in the 
United States have held that the refusal by one spouse to have sexual intercourse, 
without cause or excuse, if persisted in for the statutory period, does constitute de­
sertion as a ground for divorce. See, e.g., Hinkle v. Hinkle, 209 Ga. 554, 74 S.E.2d 
657 (1953). A New Jersey case has held that the refusal to have sexual intercourse 
without the use of contraceptives, persisted in for the statutory period, constitutes 
desertion. Kirk v. Kirk, 39 N.J. Super. 341, 120 A.2d 854 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) 
(by implication). 
63. See notes 34-44 supra and accompanying text. But cf. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 209 
Ga. 554, 74 S.E.2d 657 (1953), which held that denial of "conjugal rights" will not 
authorize a divorce on grounds of cruel and abusive treatment but may be equivalent 
to desertion. 
64. Miranda v. Miranda, 350 Mass. 478, 215 N.E.2d 669 (1966) (husband could 
not maintain a divorce action for desertion where it appeared that after wife left him 
he consented to her living apart and resisted attempts at reconcilation made by her 
in good faith). 
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D. Adultery 
Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married per­
son with a person other than the husband or wife. 65 An allegation 
of adultery differs from other grounds for divorce by virtue of spe­
cial pleading problems. If adultery is alleged as a ground for di­
vorce in any pleading, the pleader must state whether the third 
party, called the co-defendant, who allegedly committed adultery 
with the defendant-spouse, is or is not known. 66 The person is not 
named in the complaint. 
If the identity of the co-defendant is known, counsel for the 
plaintiff, after filing a summons and complaint, must file a motion 
amending the complaint by inserting the name of the co-defendant 
and his or her residence. Counsel must also file an affidavit or af­
fidavits supporting the allegation of adultery. In lieu of an affidavit, 
testimony may be taken in an ex parte motion session to support 
the allegation. The motion with the affidavit is sealed by the regis­
ter and does not become part of the public record. If the identity 
of the co-defendant is not known to the plaintiff, the divorce com­
plaint is heard in the ordinary course without regard to the forego­
ing steps. However, if the co-defendant becomes known after the 
filing of the pleadings and before the hearing, the foregoing steps 
must be taken. 67 
Where the co-defendant is known, notice of the complaint al­
leging adultery must be sent by registered or certified mail to such 
person at his or her last known address. The notice must be sent at 
least fourteen days before the return day of process on the com­
plaint. Proof of service is established by affidavit containing a par­
ticular statement of such service, accompanied, if practicable, by 
return receipt of the mailing. The co-defendant has twenty days 
within which to appear or answer from the date of mailing the 
notice. 68 
Inasmuch as adultery is essentially a clandestine affair, proof of 
the same may be accomplished by circumstantial evidence. The 
65. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 1970) states: "A married man 
who has sexual intercourse with a woman not his wife, an unmarried man who has 
sexual intercourse with a married woman or a married woman who has sexual inter­
course with a man not her husband shall be guilty of adultery ...." Adultery is 
listed as one of the permissible grounds for divorce in Massachusetts. See note 32 
supra. 
66. MASS. SUPP. R. PROB. CT. 404. 
67. Id. 
68. MASS. SUPP. R. PROB. CT. 405. 
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two essential elements necessary to establish an action for divorce 
on grounds .of adultery are opportunity and inclination, both exist­
ing simultaneously.69 The sufficiency of proof, the credibility of the 
witnesses, and the weight attributable to the testimony is, of 
course, a matter for the trier-of-fact.70 
Often, in a divorce action on the ground of adultery, the de­
fendant or co-defendant refuses to answer questions incriminating 
them on the basis of their Hfth amendment privilege. 71 This refusal 
is allowable as long as the privilege is claimed by the witness and 
not by the attorney. . 
Adultery is still a crime in Massachusetts. 72 The statute 
exempts from the deHnition of adultery, however, an unmarried 
woman who has sexual intercourse with a married man. 73 The stat­
ute exempts only women in this situation. The validity of this 
classmcation has recently been challenged on constitutional 
grounds. 74 Determination of the question must await the Hnal out­
69. DiRosa v. DiRosa, 350 Mass. 765, 213 N.E.2d 923 (1966) (fact that parties 
had ample opportunity to commit adultery is not, of itself, grounds for divorce with­
out some evidence indicating an adulterous disposition). 
70. In Padykula v. Padykula, 347 Mass. 768, 197 N.E.2d 881 (1964), it was held 
that the failure of the judge to draw an inference, which with other testimony would 
have supported a finding of adultery, from testimony that the defendant and corre­
spondent had been observed in a compromising position in an automobile late in the 
evening parked in a dark area of a parking lot, was not plainly wrong. 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 
Supp. 1978). 
72. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 1970). One found guilty of 
adultery may be imprisoned for up to three years or fined up to $500. 
73. See note 65 supra. 
74. Commonwealth v. Fontanielles, No. 78-768 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 8, 1978), 
involved a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment for adultery on the basis that 
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 14 is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. 
The indictment for adultery stemmed from a single act of voluntary and consensual 
intercourse between the defendant, a married 30-year-old male police officer, and 
a 16-year-old unmarried female. The motion to dismiss alleged that the statute vio­
lated the defendant's constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the 
laws, as well as his right to privacy. It further alleged that the statute violated the new 
equal rights amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution. 
Hampden County Superior Court Judge John Greaney heard and ruled on the 
motion. The due process claim was summarily dismissed on the grounds that the 
issue of due process was not clearly raised in the motion, the briefs, or the argu­
ments, and thus, was not properly before the court. The statute also withstood the 
generalized equal protection attack. The court determined that the legislature had a 
sufficient state interest to justify creating this classification: the preservation of the 
marital relationship. The court further noted that the legislature may, in its discre­
tion, address only a portion of a problem and ignore other areas. Similarly, the stat­
ute was held not defective as an unreasonable intrusion on personal privacy as that 
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come of the appeal. 75 
E. Gross and Confinned Habits of Intoxication 
Voluntary excessive intoxication, by use of liquor or drugs, is 
the basis for divorce on grounds of gross and connrmed habits of 
intoxication. 76 The dennition needs little interpretation. The diffi­
culty, as usual, is in the application. To constitute this ground for 
divorce, the abuse must be knowing and intentional. To the extent, 
for example, that the defendant alleges that his or her intoxication 
is a sickness and, thus, an involuntary habit, one might question 
whether a divorce on such ground may be granted. 
Extended habits of intoxication may also be the basis of a di­
vorce action on the grounds of cruel and abusive treatment. How-
concept is defined in Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 
(1974). 
The statute, however, was held to be unconstitutional under the Massachusetts 
equal rights amendment because it subjects a male and a female involved in the 
illicit act of intercourse to widely disparate penalties for identical conduct. 
In 1976, Massachusetts adopted the equal rights amendment and amended its 
constitution to declare that equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged 
because of sex, as well as race, color, creed, or national origin. This brought sex 
classifications within the extensive protection of the fourteenth amendment and sub­
jects them to strict judicial scrutiny when challenged. This is a fundamental change 
in the type of analysis involved. Now "classifications based upon sex will be permis­
sible only if they further a demonstratively compelling state interest and limit their 
impact as narrowly as possible consistent with their legislative purpose." Common­
wealth v. Fontanielles, No. 78-768, slip op. at 11 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 8, 1978). 
Judge Greaney's well-reasoned opinion demonstrates how the adultery statute 
fails to survive this strict test. The statute is clearly sexually discriminatory on its 
face. It exempts the 'unmarried woman who has sexual intercourse with a married 
man, while a similarly situated male is not exempt. The court noted that the state has 
shown no demonstratively compelling interest to justify this discrimination. Like­
wise, the statute was not drawn narrowly enough to survive constitutional attack. The 
fact that the unmarried female in this situation could be prosecuted under a related 
statute for fornication does not remedy the defect since a serious sentencing disparity 
still exists. While a conviction for fornication is a misdemeanor entailing at most 
three months in a house of corrections, conviction for adultery is a felony carrying a 
maximum penalty of three years in a state prison. The statute was held to be con­
stitutionally defective, and the motion to dismiss was allowed insofar as it raises is­
sues under the equal rights amendment. The indictment was dismissed. 
75. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts represented that it would seek appel­
late review of these findings under MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 278. 
76. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (West Supp. 1978). See Jasper v. 
Jasper, 333 Mass. 223, 129 N.E.2d 887 (1955), where it was held that the mere use of 
drugs is not a ground for divorce unless an abuse of them is shown. The fact that the 
wife took drugs on the advice of her physician, and might have to take drugs during 
the remainder of her life, did not require a grant of divorce under the statute au­
thorizing divorce for gross and confirmed habits of intoxication caused by the use of 
drugs. 
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ever, gross and confirmed habits of intoxication alone do not sup­
port the allegation of cruel and abusive treatment. 77 One must 
prove that the defendant intoxicated himself or herself in an effort 
to knowingly cause the plaintiff mental anguish in order to give rise 
to cruel and abusive treatment. 78 
For a divorce action on the ground of gross and confirmed 
habits of intoxication it is necessary that the alleged habits of the 
defendant exist up to the time of the filing of the complaint. 79 
F. 	 Imprisonment 
A divorce may be decreed in the event that one spouse has 
been sentenced to confinement for five years or more in a state or 
federal penal institution. 8o As soon as the. spouse has been sen­
tenced, the right of the other spouse to apply for divorce is com­
plete. The spouse bringing the action for divorce does not have to 
wait until the one sentenced has been released or has served his or 
her sentence. 81 After the divorce has been granted on this ground, 
it makes no difference that the defendant has been pardoned or the 
sentence reduced. 
C. 	 Impotency 
Impotency as a ground for divorce82 is the inability to engage 
in the act of sexual intercourse. 83 Impotency is not the inability to 
have children. 84 Whether impotency must exist at the time of the 
marriage in order to constitute a ground for divorce is unclear. 85 It 
77. 	 See notes 34-44 supra and accompanying text. 
78. Callan v. Callan, 280 Mass. 37, 181 N.E. 736 (1932) (evidence of intoxica­
tion without malevolent purpose toward wife does not prove cruel and abusive 
treatment). 
79. 	 Hammond v. Hammond, 240 Mass. 182, 132 N.E. 724 (1921). 
80. 	 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 2 (West Supp. 1978). 
81. 	 See 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 1781 (1967). 
82. 	 MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (West Supp. 1978). 
83. Long v. Long, 191 Ga. 606, 13 S.E.2d 349 (1941) (impotency is the perma­
nent inability on the part of one spouse to perform a complete act of sexual inter­
course). See 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE §§ 1631-1643 (1967). 
84. Reed v. Reed, 26 Tenn. App. 690, 177 S.W.2d 26 (1943) (impotency as 
grounds for divorce means the want of potentia copulandi or the incapacity to con­
sumate the marriage, and not merely incapacity for procreation). Accord, Gibbs v. 
Gibbs, 156 Fla. 404, 23 So. 2d 382 (1945); Donati v. Church, 13 N.J. Super. 454, 80 
A.2d 633 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951). 
85. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (West Supp. 1978) states that impo­
tency is a ground for divorce. It is silent as to the date on which the condition must 
be in existence. In applying the statute, the appellate courts have generally held that 
the impotency must exist at the time of the marriage in order to constitute a ground 
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seems incongruous to deny a divorce on the grounds of impotency 
when the uncontroverted fact is that the defendant became impo­
tent at some time after the marriage and that, as a result thereof, 
sexual intercourse is impossible. To avoid this conflict it may be 
possible to bring the divorce on grounds of cruel and abusive 
treatment. The complainant would have to allege that the defen­
dant refused to engage in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff­
spouse, that the refusal caused the plaintiff anxiety, and that the 
refusal was done knowingly and with the intention of causing anx­
iety.86 Such a procedure, however, does not really answer the 
question of why the occurrence of impotency after marriage war­
rants different treatment than impotency in existence at the time of 
marriage. 
It is a matter of basic equity that a person who is knowingly 
impotent at the time of the marriage cannot later bring an action 
for divorce alleging the same as the grounds. 87 Laches may also be 
raised as a defense. 
H. Nonsupport 
The ground of nonsupport is extremely difficult to prove, sel­
dom used, and as a practical matter outmoded. In order to estab­
lish this ground for divorce88 one must prove that (1) the plaintiff is 
the wife of the defendant (the husband cannot be the plaintiff), (2) 
the husband has sufficient ability to provide suitable support for 
the plaintiff, and (3) the husband grossly or wantonly and cruelly 
refused to provide such suitable maintenance. Mere neglect or re­
fusal to provide suitable support is insufficient. 89 
Historically, valid marriage imposes upon a husband the duty 
of support. 90 This apparent duty may exist even though the wife is 
living apart from her husband with his express or implied con-
for divorce and must be unknown to the innocent party. M_ v. M_, 324 Mass. 
773, 172 N.E.2d 240 (1961) (wife's impotency unknown to husband at time of mar­
riage is ground for divorce); Reed v. Reed, 26 Tenn. App. 690, 177 S.W.2d 26 (1943) 
(no relief will be granted where impotency arises after marriage). 
86. See notes 34-43 supra and accompanying text. It may be somewhat difficult 
to establish that the spouse knowingly and intentionally became impotent. 
87. It is a principle of justice and reason that no one can take advantage of their 
own wrong. 
88. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (West Supp. 1978). 
89. To entitle the wife to a divorce, the refusal or neglect of the husband to 
provide suitable support and maintenance for the wife must be gross or wanton and 
cruel. Young v. Young, 333 Mass. 767, 129 N.E.2d 894 (1955). 
90. French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935). 
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sent. 91 What is suitable support is a matter to be determined by 
the judge according to the facts of each case. Similarly, whether 
the defendant is of sufficient ability to provide suitable support is 
likewise a matter for the judge to decide after consideration of the 
circumstances of the case. 92 The husband's historic duty to support 
may not withstand a modern constitutional challenge. 
IV. PRESENTATION OF AN UNCONTESTED DIVORCE 
The presentation of an uncontested divorce case is one of the 
easiest, and at the same time, one of the most abused proceedings 
in the courts of Massachusetts. The reason for its abuse is its obvi­
ous simplicity and the lack of an adversary. To avoid difficulties, 
the attorney should simply follow the declarative statements on his 
or her copy of the divorce complaint and turn the declarative 
statements into questions. 93 
The attorney for the plaintiff has a responsibility to inform the 
91. Id. 
92. See generally 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETIS PRACTICE §§ 1761-1765 
(1967). 
93. The following may serve as a guideline: 
1. "Tell the court your name and current address." (If the address is 
different from the address on the complaint, ask if the witness was living at 
the address shown on the complaint at the time of filing the complaint.) 
2. "What is the defendant's name and current address?" (If the address 
is different from that shown on the complaint, see number 1 above.) 
3. "When and where were you married?" 
4. "Did you always live in __ County as husband and wife after 
that?" or "Where did you live in Massachusetts after that?" 
5. "Where did you last live as husband and wife?" 
6. "When did you separate?" 
7. "Tell the court what happened on the day you separated." 
8. "What led up to that?" 
9. (optional) "Had this ever happened before?" 
10. (optional) "What was the basic problem in the marriage?" 
11. "How many children were born of this marriage?" 
12. "Tell the court the names and dates of birth of your children." 
13. "Are they all now residing with you?" ("Are you seeking custody of 
the children? ") or "With whom are the children presently residing?" 
14. "How are you presently supported?" 
15. "What are the health insurance provisions?" 
16. "What are the assets of the marriage?" (stocks, bonds, bank ac­
counts, etc.) 
17. "Does your husbandiwife work? If so, how much does he/she earn?" 
18. "What do you suggest for visitation rights for your spouse?" 
19. "Have you brought any other action in any other court concerning 
this marriage?" 
20. "Do you wish to resume your maiden/former name?" 
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court of the financial affairs of the defendant after a reasonable ef­
fort on the attorney's part to ascertain those affairs.94 Frequently, 
the plaintiff's lawyer may ask the plaintiff on the witness stand how 
much the defendant has been paying in alimony or support since 
the date of the separation, or how much the plaintiff is requesting 
the court to order the defendant to pay. Plaintiff's lawyer has an 
obligation to provide the court with accurate, up to date informa­
tion about the defendant's financial status. A careful lawyer will 
issue a subpoena to the defendant requiring his or her presence on 
the day of the hearing for purposes of ascertaining his or her ability 
to pay. If the defendant fails to appear, the judge is authorized to 
issue a capias. 95 
In the presentation of an uncontested divorce case, the ques­
tions asked must clearly establish the following: (1) The jurisdiction 
of the court, (2) the venue, (3) the ground for divorce, and (4) the 
collateral issues of custody, alimony and support, and visitation 
rights. 96 One question that should be asked in all contested matters 
is: "How do you feel about visitation rights?" Many times the wit­
ness will answer the question in such a way as to inform the court 
that he or she has no objection to the other spouse's reasonable 
rights of visitation. On the other hand, the plaintiff might answer 
that he or she has serious objection to visitation rights of the de­
fendant for certain reasons. Such an important matter should not 
be left to conjecture of the probate court. 
In most counties throughout Massachusetts, a corroborating 
witness is not necessary in an uncontested divorce case. The plain­
tiff is the only witness necessary at the trial of the action. In those 
cases where the ground for divorce is irretrievable breakdown, 
both parties should appear before the court at the time of the hear­
ing.97 If the plaintiff's lawyer has no information concerning the 
defendant's financial status, he should serve the defendant with a 
subpoena. Thereafter, if the defendant does not appear, upon re­
quest, the court can issue a capias. 98 
94. This is in accordance with MASS. SUPP. R. PROB. CT. 40l. See note 25 
supra. 
95. The "capias" is a judicial writ by which the judge may order the sheriff to 
apprehend a particular individual and bring him before the court on a certain day to 
answer to the plaintiff in the action. See Oliver v. Kallock, 133 Me. 403, 178 A. 843 
(1935). 
96. See the suggested guideline for questioning at note 93 supra. 
97. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra. 
98. See note 95 supra. 
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V. CONTESTED ACTIONS 
A. In General 
In preparation for a contested divorce action the plaintiff's at­
torney must ascertain the extent and value of the assets owned by 
the defendant, their location, and whether or not they are encum­
bered. This information is essential in determining the validity of 
requests for alimony and support, or the assignment of various 
items of property pursuant to the statute governing equitable divi­
sion of the marital property.99 Depositions can effectively provide 
this information. 1oo The court may, upon motion, order that the 
testimony at a deposition be recorded by other than stenographic 
means. 101 This allows depositions to be taken by a tape recorder 
with a simple cassette cartridge at little or no expense to the par­
ties. 
Every effort should be made by the parties' counsel to agree 
beforehand to the nature, extent, and fair market value of the de­
fendant's assets. More time and expense is spent at the time of trial 
eliciting testimony from expert witnesses regarding valuation of as­
sets than should be necessary. The fair market value of closely held 
stock, the value of unmarketed securities, the value of minority 
interests in a family corporation, and other similar valuations may 
frequently be adjusted and agreed to by counsel prior to trial. 
Often, the merits of the divorce action are not contested. 
What is contested is the alimony and support payments, the cus­
tody rights, and the allocation of the marital property.102 If that is 
the case, counsel may inform the trial court that the divorce action 
will go in as an uncontested matter, and that once a prima facie 
case has been testified to, the matter will take on the complexion 
of a contested action. 
Most probate judges in Massachusetts will encourage pre-trial 
conferences in order to limit and narrow the issues. loa Other 
judges not only encourage such a conference, but will ask counsel, 
prior to the commencement of the litigation, whether or not they 
will agree to submit their case to the judge in his lobby. This pro­
99. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1978). 
100. For the rules on depositions and discovery, see generally MASS. R. DOM. 
REL. P. 26-37. 
101. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 30(b)(4). 
102. See MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1978). 
103. The court has the discretionary power to direct these conferences. MASS. 
R. DOM. REL. P. 16. 
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cedure allows the judge to hear all the facts without regard to the 
rules of evidence, and with a view towards a fair and speedy dis­
position of the proceeding. Of course, there are times when a 
client insists, as a matter of right, to his or her day in court. Under 
those circumstances, an attorney has no other choice than to try 
the matter and engage in a full-scale hearing. If that is the case, 
the attorney should take care to inform the client of the possible 
length of time necessary to try the case, as well as the attendant 
attorney's fees and other ancillary costs that the client will incur. 
Many times, in the face of this expense, a client will submit to ar­
bitration before a judge in the judge's lobby. Since the same judge 
is going to hear similar evidence in a courtroom setting under cir­
cumstances which will be much more expensive, traumatic, and 
time consuming, arbitration is a convenient alternative to a full 
trial. The outcome of arbitration, however, possibly may be unap­
pealable. 
B. Defenses 
Recrimination as a defense in divorce actions has been abol­
ished. 104 Possible defenses to an action for divorce include: (1) 
Condonation, (2) connivance, (3) collusion, (4) mental illness, and 
(5) no valid marriage. 105 
1. Condonation 
Condonation is the conditional pardoning of a known marital 
offense and restores equality before the law. lOS It is an affirmative 
defense and, therefore, must be pleaded and proven. Condonation 
is not a statutory defense in Massachusetts. It has been developed 
by case law over the years. It is essentially an act of forgiveness 
and has been recognized as a necessary element in social relation­
ships for centuries. The forgiveness must be voluntary, however, 
104. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § I (West Supp. 1978). See note 58 supra. 
See generally Inker, McGrath, & Katz, Abolition of Recrimination as a Defense in 
Divorce Cases, 18 B.B.]., May 1974, at 7. 
105. In addition to these, there are several technical defenses which may be 
raised. These are enumerated in MASS. R. DaM. REL. P. 12(b). 
106. Condonation is the conditional remission or forgiveness of one spouse, by 
means of continuance or resumption of marital cohabitation, of a known matrimonial 
offense committed by the other that would constitute a cause of divorce. The condi­
tion is that the offense shall not be repeated. Thurn v. Thurn, 105 Colo. 352,98 P.2d 279 
(1940). "If the innocent party is willing to forgive, even conditionally, the law will 
give full effect to it." 2A ]. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 1830, at 243 
(1967). 
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and cannot be made out of fear or necessity.107 Neither a single 
act of intercourse nor of cohabitation, standing alone, will estab­
lish condonation. 108 If condonation does exist, and is pleaded and 
proven, it constitutes a complete defense for past misbehavior. 109 
Condonation frequently creates a problem when establishing a 
prima facie case for an uncontested divorce action. For example, 
the plaintiff may testifY that acts which allegedly constitute cruel 
and abusive treatment happened several months before the final 
separation date. Thereafter, the parties lived together as husband 
and wife for a long period of time. The question of condonation of 
the alleged misconduct by continued cohabitation is thereby in­
advertently placed in issue and must be answered. 110 
2. Connivance and Collusion 
Both connivance and collusion are affirmative defenses. Like 
condonation, they are not set out by statute in Massachusetts but 
have been developed by case law. Connivance and collusion are 
similar in that each involves the consent of one or both of the 
spouses to the acts of marital misconduct alleged as the ground for 
divorce. Connivance is the corrupt intent or plan of one spouse to 
cause, directly or indirectly, the other spouse to commit an act 
which is a cause for divorce. 111 Connivance, if proved, is a bar to 
an action for divorce; the· alleged ground being immaterial. The 
basis of this defense is that a spouse who connives and encourages 
the other spouse to commit a marital offense is not an innocent 
lO7. Belville v. Belville, 114 Vt. 404, 45 A.2d 571 (1946) (no condonation where 
fear of husband and love for children caused wife to remain with husband and have 
sexual intercourse). 
108. Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 144 N.E. 763 (1924) (single act of intercourse 
not necessarily condonation of previously existing ground for divorce). Condonation 
is essentially a question of fact. It is a state of mind to be determined upon all the 
evidence, including rational inferences. Id.; Quigley v. Quigley, 3lO Mass. 415, 38 
N.E.2d 624 (1941). 
109. Johnson v. Johnson, 2lO Ga. 795, 82 S.E.2d 831 (1954); Denisi v. Denisi, 
334 Mass. 392, 135 N.E.2d 668 (1956); Shaw v. Shaw, 122 Mont. 593, 208 P.2d 514 
(1949). 
1l0. See Hayden v. Hayden, 326 Mass. 587, 96 N.E.2d 136 (1950). Cf. Cabral v. 
Cabral, 323 Mass. 441, 82 N.E.2d 616 (1948) (resumption of marital relations was a 
condonation of cruel and abusive treatment on condition that the defendant would 
thereafter faithfully observe his marital relations; but it did not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction to grant plaintiff a divorce on defendant's subsequent breach of the im­
plied condition). 
lli. See 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 1831 (1967 & Supp. 
1976) and the cases cited therein. 
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party and should not be entitled to a divorce on those grounds. u2 
This defense is established by evidence showing either active or 
passive consent on the part of the plaintiff-spouse to the commis­
sion of the marital misconduct. 
Collusion is an agreement, actual or implied, between both 
spouses that one will commit an act which will give rise to a di­
vorce on behalf of the other. U3 Collusion is really a conspiracy 
between the spouses to obtain a divorce by fraud. If collusion is 
established, a divorce will not be granted even though the com­
plainant may actually have a valid ground for divorce. u4 The collu­
sive agreement is considered to be a fraud upon the court and is 
void as against public policy. 
3. Mental Illness 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has stated: "By 
the consensus of American authority a divorce cannot be granted 
on the ground of cruel and abusive treatment because of acts done 
by an insane person. "115 Neither can the acts of a mentally ill per­
son be cause for a divorce action of themselves or on any other 
ground. 11s However, where insanity occurs during the pendency of 
a divorce action, a court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the 
incompetent spouse. 117 
4. No Valid MaITiage 
Divorce may only be decreed if there has been a valid mar­
riage. us It is significant to note, however, that impotency does not 
112. Where the marital wrong complained of has actually been connived and 
consented to, no injury has been suffered and the moving party is not entitled to 
judicial relief on the basis of his or her improper conduct. Id. 
113. Id. § 1829. 
114. Thompson v. Thompson, 70 Mich. 62, 37 N.W. 710 (1888). 
115. Rice v. Rice, 332 Mass. 489, 491, 125 N.E.2d 787, 788 (1955). Accord, 
Hano v. Hano, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1085, 367 N.E.2d 1190. See note 38 
supra for an extended discussion. 
116. Mental illness is not a ground for divorce in Massachussets. However, 
mental illness existing at the time of marriage is a ground for annulment. Davis v. 
Seller, 329 Mass. 385, 108 N.E.2d 656 (1952). See 2A J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS 
PRACTICE § 1802 (1967) (listing states where insanity or mental illness is a ground 
for divorce). 
117. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 15 (West Supp. 1978) provides as fol­
lows: "Ifduring the pendency ofan action for divorce the defendant is insane, the court 
shall appoint a suitable guardian to appear and answer in like manner as a guardian 
for an infant defendant in any civil action may be appointed." 
118. Mangue v. Mangue, 1 Mass. 240 (1804) (divorce will not be decreed un­
less a legal marriage is proved). 
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render a marriage void, but only makes it voidable. As a result, the 
defense of no valid marriage cannot be sustained if it is based sole­
lyon impotency.119 
C. Use of Stenographer 
If the trial is contested, a stenographer should always be re­
quested. A party has an absolute right to a stenographer at no cost. 
A request must be made in writing to the register of probate at 
least forty-eight hours before trial. 12o In the event that the trial is 
cancelled, however, care must be taken to notifY the register of 
probate twenty-four hours in advance. Otherwise costs may be as­
sessed. 
D. Probation Officers or Family Service Officers 
Family law practitioners should always remember to subpoena 
a probation officer or family service officer or other guardian ad 
litem who has completed an investigation involving any issue at the 
trial. 121 In those cases which involve custody and visitation rights, 
the testimony of the investigator is essential. 122 In the event that 
the report is contrary to one's position, intensive cross-examination 
is in order.123 
E. Counsel Fees 
Counsel may file an application for fees to be paid by the 
other spouse in order to enable his or her client to defend or prose­
cute a complaint. Such application indicates that the party intends 
in good faith to defend or prosecute the complaint, and must con­
tain a statement to this effect.124 
119. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text. 
120. MASS. SuPP. R. PROB. CT. 202. 
121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 56A (West Supp. 1978) empowers a 
probate court judge to appoint a guardian ad litem to investigate the facts in any 
proceeding involving questions as to the care, custody, and maintenance of minor 
children, or other matters involving domestic relations. The guardian ad litem sub­
mits to the court, prior to the final judgment or decree, a written report on the results 
of the investigation. This written report is open for inspection to all parties and their 
attorneys. See also note 27 supra. 
122. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 269, 341 N.E.2d 655. 
123. In Gilmore v. Gilmore, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 269, 279, 341 N.E.2d 655, 659, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated: "In order to determine adequately 
the reliability and accuracy of a report, we believe that, as a matter of sound judicial 
policy, the parties should have the opportunity to rebut the report, including the 
right to cross-examine the investigator."' (Footnote omitted). 
124. MASS. SuPP. R. PROB. CT. 406. This application for allowance does not 
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The amount of attorney's fees, of course, varies from case to 
case. One guideline, however, is as follows: 
In determining what is a fair and reasonable charge to be 
made by an attorney for his services many considerations are 
pertinent, including the ability and reputation of the attorney, 
the demand for his services by others, the amount and impor­
tance of the matter involved, the time spent, the prices usually 
charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same 
neighborhood, the amount of money or the value of the property 
affected by controversy, and the results secured. Neither the 
time spent nor any other single factor is necessarily decisive of 
what is to be considered as a fair and reasonable charge for such 
service. 125 
Effective July 1, 1977, any judge of the superior court, probate 
court, land court, or housing court may order a party to pay rea­
sonable counsel fees and other costs and expenses incurred in de­
fending any frivolous claim in any civil action, including those in 
domestic relations cases. 126 If the party against whom the frivolous 
claim is asserted is not represented by counsel, the court may 
award that party an amount representing the reasonable costs and 
expenses 'of defending the claim. Before awarding these fees and 
costs, the court must find that all or substantially all of the claims, 
defenses, setoffs, or counterclaims are insubstantial, frivolous, and 
not advanced in good faith. The court is obligated to specify in 
reasonable detail the method by which the amount of the award 
was computed. 
Lawyers and litigants are cautioned not to confuse a frivolous 
claim with an argument that is novel or unusual. 127 Lawyers are 
encouraged to promote the latter, while the statute discourages 
promotion of the former. . 
extend to proceedings to affirm or annul a marriage. Fuss v. Fuss, 1977 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 363, 368 N.E.2d 27l. 
125. Cummings v. National Shawmut Bank of Boston, 284 Mass. 563, 569, 188 
N.E. 489, 492 (1934). See also Paone v. Gerrig, 362 Mass. 757, 291 N.E.2d 426 
(1973). 
126. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §§ 6F, 6G(West Supp. 1978). 
127. In an action brought under MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, §§ 6F, 6G 
(West Supp. 1978) for an assessment of additional interest on the grounds that the 
claims advanced by the appellant were insubstantial, frivolous, or not advanced in 
good faith, it was held that the appellee was not entitled to such additional interest 
in view of the fact that the appeal concerned the construction of a newly enacted 
statute which presented substantial questions of first impression. Goodwin Bros. 
Leasing, Inc. v. Nousis, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1663,366 N.E.2d 38. 
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F. Findings of Fact 
Until recently, the court, in domestic relations matters, was 
not required to issue a "finding of facts, conclusions of law" unless 
(1) counsel filed a written motion prior to final argument, (2) a 
stenographer was present at the trial, and (3) the original transcript 
was ordered from the stenographer, filed with the court, and satis­
factory arrangements for payment of the cost, if any, were made. 128 
What was supplied by the judge, thereafter, was "finding of facts, 
conclusions of law, and judgment," the judgment being stated 
separately pursuant to Rule 58. 129 Recent cases indicate, however, 
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court mandates findings 
of fact be entered by the judge in all cases involving the statute 
concerning the award of alimony or the equitable distribution of 
marital property.130 
C. Statement of Evidence 
When there is no stenographic record or when the transcript 
is unavailable, both parties may state the evidence in written form 
to the court on behalf of their respective interests. 131 The judge, 
thereafter, enters his or her findings and the entire proceedings, as 
settled and approved, comprise the record on appeal. 
H. Stay of Proceedings 
The filing of an appeal stays the running of the nisi period in a 
divorce case,132 but does not stay the operation of any other part of 
the judgment. Provisions for custody, visitation, alimony, and sup­
port or maintenance are not automatically stayed by the filing of an 
appeal. 133 In order to stay such orders, a motion must be filed and 
allowed by the court. 
128. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 52(a), 52(c). 
129. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 58. See Moran v. Moran, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. 
Sh. 278, 360 N.E.2d 665, where the appellate court overturned a lower court decision 
in a divorce action which had ordered the wife to convey her interest in the home to 
the husband. The appellate court found the trial judge's voluntary report of material 
facts and findings inadequate to support the decree. 
130. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1978). See Bianco v. 
Bianco, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2702, 358 N.E.2d 243 (record must show beyond doubt 
that the judge, in making an equitable division of marital property, considered 'all 
factors set forth by the statute). Accord, King v. King, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1494, 364 
N.E.2d 1218; Rice v. Rice, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 787,361 N.E.2d 1305. 
131. MASS. R. App. P. 8(c). The statement of evidence or proceedings may be 
prepared from the best available means, jncluding recollection. 
132. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 58(c). See note 48 supra. 
133. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 62(g). 
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I. Husband and Wife Conversations 
In a contested action, private conversations between a hus­
band and wife are excluded. 134 This exclusion is sometimes re­
ferred to as a privileged communication. The statute, however, 
creates a disqualification of both spouses to testifY to private con­
versations and not merely a privilege which must be appropriately 
claimed and may be waived. 135 Cases in the district court arising 
out of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, how­
ever, are exempted from this statutory prohibition. 13s 
To the extent that the conversations between husband and 
wife are conducted in the presence of a third party, the conversa­
tion is not private, and may therefore be testified to by one of the 
spouses. 137 Care must be taken, however, to lay a proper founda­
tion indicating the presence of a third party prior to offering the 
testimony. This foundation must indicate that the third party was 
intelligent enough to understand the conversation and was within 
hearing distance. 138 
In addition to the "non-private" exception, there are several 
other qualifications to the foregoing rule. For example, abusive 
language said by one party to another139 or exclamation of pain and 
134. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West Supp. 1978). 
135. Commonwealth v. Gillis, 358 Mass. 215, 263 N.E.2d 437 (1970); Kaye v. 
Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 249 N.E.2d 583 (1969). 
136. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233A, § 20 (West Supp. 1978). "It is quite 
plain that in creating [this exception] the legislature had in mind the great probabil­
ity that the exclusionary rule would destroy the entire cause of action between hus­
band and wife." Inker & McGrath, Husband and Wife Conversations, 8 B.B.]., May 
1964, at 33. 
137. A conversation between husband and wife in the waiting room of a train 
station which could be heard up to four or five feet from where they were standing 
and by people coming and going was not a "private" conversation within the mean­
ing of the statute, and was thus admissible in a divorce action on grounds of cruel 
and abusive treatment. Linnell v. Linnell, 249 Mass. 51, 143 N.E. 813 (1924). 
138. In Amer Realty Co. v. Spack, 280 Mass. 96, 181 N.E. 753 (1932), it was 
held that a conversation between husband and wife in the presence of children was 
properly excluded from evidence where there was nothing showing the age or intel­
ligence of the children. Cf. Freedman v. Freedman, 238 Mass. 150, 130 N .E. 220 
(1921), where it was held that in a wife's suit for divorce on the ground of cruel and 
abusive treatment, the admission of a conversation between spouses in the presence 
of their nine-year-old child was not necessarily improper. It was for the trial court to 
determine whether the child was of sufficient intelligence at the time to understand 
what was said. In the same case it was also held that a conversation between spouses 
in a public street was properly excluded where it did not appear that any of the 
passersby or persons in the vicinity paid attention to them or could hear their words. 
See generally Inker & McGrath, supra note 136, at 30. 
139. Commonwealth v. Gillis, 358 Mass. 215, 263 N.E.2d 437 (1970) (state­
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suffering, are not generally regarded as "conversation," and thus 
are not within the prohibition of the statute. 140 
J. Hearings Before a Master 
More and more probate judges are referring routine cases to a 
master when the trial time is estimated to be longer than several 
days.141 Most judges prefer to hear contested cases on a day to day 
basis. Frequently, the second and subsequent days of trial will 
commence at the afternoon session to enable the judge to hear 
other scheduled cases of shorter duration in the morning. 
The judge's order of reference to the master will direct him to 
report on particular issues joined by the answer to the complaint. 
The master may also be directed by the judge to perform any par­
ticular act set forth in the order of reference. 142 
Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order 
of reference, the master has the power to regulate all the proceed­
ings during the hearing. 143 Unless otherwise ordered, the master 
sets the time and place for the first meeting of the parties within 
twenty days after receipt of the order of reference. 144 
In actions tried in probate court, the court accepts the mas­
ter's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 145 Written 
ments not reasonably to be regarded as "conversation" are not within the statutory 
prohibition against disclosure of private husband-wife conversations, as abusive or 
threatening words do not have any confidential aspect within the purpose of the 
statutory protection). 
140. See Inker & McGrath, supra note 136. 
141. "The court in which any action is pending may appoint a master therein 
.. [T]he word 'master' includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner, a commis­
sioner, and an assessor ...." MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 53(a). The court may also 
"appoint a master in all cases where the parties agree that the case may be so tried." 
MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 53(b). 
142. For example, the master may be ordered to determine the value of real 
estate and effect a sale thereof pursuant to a motion to proceed in rem. 
143. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 53(c). The master is authorized to take all mea­
sures necessary and proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the or­
der. 
144. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 53(d)(I). The master is under the duty to proceed 
with all diligence. 
145. MASS. R. elV. P. 53(e)(2). See Richmond v. Richmond, 340 Mass. 367, 164 
N.E.2d 155 (1960). That case involved a suit by a divorced husband for an account­
ing by his ex-wife of all wedding presents received by her, a determination of his 
interest therein, and an equitable distribution thereof. The wife, in turn, filed a 
counterclaim for a similar accounting by her ex-husband. The case was referred to a 
master who heard evidence as to the value of the various gifts and concluded that 
the husband owed the wife a total of $1,550. The master stated, "In making my 
finding as to the value ... I have taken into consideration ... evidence presented by 
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objections to the report may be served on the opponent within ten 
days after being served with notice of the filing of the master's 
report. 146 Thereafter, the party objecting proceeds by a motion 
with appropriate notice. 147 
K. Appeals 
An appeal from an interlocutory or final judgment or order of a 
probate court may be taken by any person aggrieved by such 
judgment or order. 148 The notice of appeal must be filed at the 
registry of probate within thirty days of the entry of the judgment 
and may be taken to the appeals court.149 Alternatively, a judge of 
the probate court may reserve and report to the appeals court the 
evidence in all questions of law in a case over which he or she is 
presiding. 150 Upon appeal, the appeals court or the supreme judi­
cial court may enter any judgment or order which it determines the 
probate court should have entered, may remand the case, or may 
make any order which law and justice require. 151 
both parties and have drawn on my own experience as a lawyer over the past many 
years .... " Id. at 368-69, 164 N.E.2d at 156. The husband objected to the master's 
report on the ground that the evidence received as to the value was incompetent and 
inadmissible. In affirming the decree, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
held that it was proper for the master to draw on his own knowledge and experience 
in making findings of value. The appellant's objection to the evidence received 
could not be considered where no report of the evidence had been requested below. 
146. MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 53(e)(2). 
147. The party must comply with the motion notice requirement prescribed in 
MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 6(c), 6(d). See note 19 supra. 
148. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 215, § 9 (West Supp. 1978). An appeal is a 
judicial proceeding created by statute and is not a constitutional or inherent right. 
Carilli v. Hersey, 303 Mass. 82, 20 N.E.2d 492 (1939). The right of appeal is only 
available to a party who has some pecuniary interest, or some personal right, which 
is immediately or remotely affected or concluded by the decree to be appealed. Peti­
tion of Lovejoy, 352 Mass. 660, 227 N.E.2d 497 (1967) (life beneficiaries of testamen­
tary trust who had joined in agreement on appointment of successor trustee were 
"persons aggrieved" by decree appointing another person successor trustee and had 
standing to appeal). Accord, Boudakian v. Town of Westport, 344 Mass. 61, 181 
N.E.2d 336 (1962). But cf. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. First Church, 346 
Mass. 780, 195 N.E.2d 535 (1964) (church did not have the right to appeal from 
decree ruling that cy pres doctrine was not applicable where it had no legally recog­
nized interest in legacy which it sought). 
149. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 215, § 9 (West Supp. 1978). In any case on 
appeal, the MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF ApPELLATE PROCEDURE, effective July 1, 
1974, control. See, e.g., MASS. R. APP. P. 4. See generally 3 J. LOMBARD, MASSACHU­
SETTS PRACTICE §§ 2431-2455 (1967 & Supp. 1976). 
150. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 215, § 13 (West Supp. 1978). 
151. ld. § 28. It should be noted that the findings of a probate judge which are 
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If a stenographer was requested under Supplemental Rule of 
Probate Court 202,152 a record is available on which the appeal 
may be considered by the appellate court. 153 Timely assembly of 
that record on appeal has assumed increased significance under 
Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure. An appellant has forty 
days after filing the notice of appeal to take whatever action is 
necessary to enable the clerk of the probate court to assemble the 
record. 154 This rule differs from the federal rules of appellate pro­
cedure. Under the Massachusetts rule, the appellant is required 
only to initiate timely assembly of the record by taking "any action" 
necessary to make assembly possible. The corresponding federal 
rule155 requires the appellant to cause the record to be assembled 
and transmitted to the court of appeals within the specified 
time. 156 
necessarily implied from an entry of a decree will not be reversed by the Massachu­
setts Supreme Judicial Court on appeal unless they were plainly wrong. Stein v. 
Domig, 355 Mass. 797, 247 N.E.2d 397 (1969). 
152. See note 120 supra and accompanying text. 
153. The existence of, and quality of, a record of the proceedings below is often 
determinative of the outcome on appeal. Lack of a competent record greatly curtails 
the ability of the appellate court to review the lower court's decision. In Donoghue 
v. Donoghue, 1977 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 1l00, 368 N.E.2d 818, the husband appealed 
from a judgment of divorce nisi asserting that the trial judge should have dismissed 
the complaint on the ground that the wife's divorce from her previous husband was 
invalid. It was held that where the husband did not request findings of fact from the 
judge and did not include the transcript of the proceedings in the record, the appel­
late court was compelled to conclude that the entry of the judgment imported a find­
ing by the judge of every fact required to support it. Similar results occurred in Brine 
v. Brine, 1975 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 484, 324 N.E.2d 910. There an appeal was taken 
from a decree modifying an earlier decree for support. It was held that where the 
appellate court had no transcript of evidence, no report of material facts, and no 
voluntary report by the probate judge, all that was open for review on appeal was 
whether the decree could have been entered on the pleadings. 
Generally, the record on appeal consists of the original papers and exhibits on 
file, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the docket entries 
prepared by the clerk of the lower court. See MASS. R. ApP. P. 8(a). In the absence of 
an official transcript of the proceedings, the appellant may prepare his or her own 
statement of the evidence under rule 8(c). See note 131 supra and accompanying 
text. 
154. MASS. R. App. P. 9(c). 
155. FED. R. ApP. P. ll(a). 
156. In Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 1978 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 187,372 N.E.2d 242, the court allowed an appeal even though the record was not 
assembled within the 40-day period. It noted the difference between the state rule 
and the federal rule on this point and stated, "[O]ur rule does not require the record 
to be assembled in forty days." Id. at 190, 372 N.E.2d at 244. The appellant was 
deemed to have fulfilled her obligations by taking all actions necessary, or reason­
ably requested by the clerk, to enable the clerk of the lower court to assemble the 
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Failure of the appellant to initiate a timely assembly of the 
record is ground for dismissal of the appeal. 157 The probate court, 
for cause shown, may extend the time for complying with the re­
quirement if the request is made during the original forty day 
period or any timely extension thereof. 15s Expiration of the forty 
day period without a request for an extension, and without appel­
lant having taken all steps necessary for assembly of the record, 
leaves the court without power to permit the appeal to proceed 
and without power to grant an extension of time for assembly of 
the record. 159 However, the court is not required at that point to 
dismiss the appeal. Under the appropriate circumstances the appel­
lant may be allowed to petition the Massachusetts Appeals Court 
for an extension of time to assemble the record. The probate court 
exercises its discretion on whether or not to dismiss the appeal in 
light of the particular circumstances surrounding the delay in the 
assembly of the record. 160 




In 1974, Massachusetts joined the growing number of jurisdic­
tions161 that provide for apportioning property after a divorce using 
principles of economic contribution in addition to traditional no-
record. Accord, Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 1978 Mass. Adv. 
Sh.2239. 
157. MASS. R. App. P. lO(c). 
158. MASS. R. App. P. 9(e). 
159. Vyskocil v. Vyskocil, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2242. 
160. In Vyskocil v. Vyskocil, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2242, the Massachusetts Su­
preme Judicial Court stated that even if the 40-day period has expired and the 
appellant has failed to take all steps necessary to allow assembly of the record, the 
judge still retains discretion on whether or not to dismiss the appeal. The court 
termed this failure a "serious misstep," the usual remedy for which would be dis­
missal. However, the dismissal is not automatic. "[Tlhe court may deny the motion 
to dismiss in a case that presents a meritorious issue on appeal when the court finds 
that there has been excusable neglect." [d. at 2246. Under such circumstances, the 
court stated that the proper course was for the plaintiff to press for an extension of 
time in the appeals court. Thereafter, "[tlhe motion to dismiss ... could appro­
priately be pressed if and when an extension had been denied in the Appeals Court, 
or when it became apparent that the appellant was not actively seeking such relief in 
the Appeals Court." Id. 
This decision modifies the holding of Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Healy 
Corp., 1977 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 69, 85, 359 N.E.2d 634, 643, which had indicated 
that the court must allow the motion to dismiss under such circumstances. 
16l. For a discussion of the practices in other United States jurisdictions, as 
well as in other countries, see K. GRAY, REALLOCATION OF PROPERTY ON DIVORCE 
(1977). 
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tions of support. Probate courts now have the power to assign 
property to a party to a divorce based, not merely on support 
needs, but on equitable considerations that take into account the 
partnership aspects of marriage. 162 This newer, property assign­
ment approach adds needed flexibility to the older statutory 
alimony scheme, which was based largely on support needs. 
Conceptually, the duty to pay alimony flows directly from the 
husband's historic duty to support the wife. 163 The legal theory 
underlying alimony restricts its effectiveness as a satisfactory eco­
nomic termination to a marriage. Because support was the essence 
of alimony, the size of the award depended on the husband's ability 
to pay, and the wife's needs relative to her station in life. 164 This 
approach ignored the valuable economic contribution of the 
162. The statute allowing property assignment provides: 
Upon divorce or upon motion in an action brought at any time after a 
divorce, the court may make a judgment for either of the parties to pay 
alimony to the other. In addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay alimony, 
the court may assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the estate of 
the other. In determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be paid, or in 
fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be so assigned, the 
court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider the 
length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the 
age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational 
skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and 
the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. 
The court may also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the 
acquisition, preservation or appreciation in the value of their respective es­
tates and the contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the 
family unit. 
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1978). The statute differs in particu­
lars from, but is substantially similar in approach to, the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE ACT § 397(a). See generally lnker, Walsh, & Perochi, Alimony and As­
signment of Property: The New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts, 10 SUFFOLK L. 
REV. 1 (1975). 
163. See lnker, Walsh, & Perrochi, supra note 162, at 12. The pre-1974 Massa­
chusetts alimony statute, MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 208, § 34 (West 1958), proVided that 
a wife could be ordered to make payments to her husband "in the nature of 
alimony." While this provision was commendable for its two-way approach, it dupli­
cated the undesirable restrictions inherent in the traditional alimony scheme by 
limiting awards to cases where a wife earned more money than the husband, and he 
therefore looked to her for support. E.g., Topor v. Topor, 287 Mass. 473, 192 N.E.2d 
52 (1934); Ober v. Ober, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 294 N.E.2d 449 (1973). 
164. As a practical matter, the size of the award often varied with the strength 
of the evidence presented regarding the conduct of the parties during the marriage. 
Many times the concept of fault overrode the more logical criterion of need; alimony 
became a prize to be snared by the clever attorney for the client. 
The new statute does not specifically mention fault, but it retains the concept 
through the "conduct of the parties" factor which must be considered by the probate 
judge. See text accompanying note 173 infra. 
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homemaker towards all property acquired during the marriage. 
Additionally, absconding payors made alimony awards an unreliable 
means of support for the dependent party. 
The newer, property assignment statute is conceptually an­
chored to the notion that marriage is an economic partnership. 165 
By recognizing that both parties frequently share the burden166 of 
acquiring property during the marriage, the property assignment 
approach provides for an equitable division of property when the 
parties divorce. Probate judges have more flexibility now than 
under the prior statutory scheme in fashioning a final judgment in 
a divorce proceeding. Although the statute lists the factors for the 
probate court to consider,167 the relative weight assigned to each 
factor is a matter of discretion for the court. This element of discre­
tion provides the flexibility needed to tailor each final judgment to 
the individual circumstances at hand. 168 
The wide discretion given the probate judges to award alimony 
and assign property is not without limits. The statute, by its terms, 
requires the court to consider all the factors listed in the third 
sentence: "the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties 
during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount 
and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, 
liabilities, and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of 
each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. "169 The 
fourth sentence goes on to list the following factors that may be 
considered by the court: "the contribution of each of the parties in 
the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their re­
spective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a 
homemaker to the family unit. "170 The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court has held that, because the statute fully defines the 
165. For a full discussion of the role played by sharing principles in modern 
legal thought concerning marital property, see Pranger, Sharing Principles and the 
Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1977). 
166. See Inker, Walsh, & Perrochi, supra note 162, at 11. Proof that the statute 
has jettisoned the alimony concept as the exclusive theory of a property award is the 
phrasing in the second sentence: "!i]n addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay 
alimony...." [d. at 4. 
167. See note 162 supra. 
168. The property assignment system is not only more flexible than the prior 
statutory scheme, it is also more flexible than most community property systems. 
This element of flexibility has been criticized by some commentators because the 
unpredictability of the final award may discourage negotiated property settlements. 
See Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 413, 433 (1976). 
169. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1978). 
170. [d. 
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scope of the trial court's discretion, "consideration of factors not 
enumerated in [section] 34 would constitute an error of law. "171 
Rice v. Rice172 furnishes a quick example of the statute's po­
tential. The parties were married for almost twenty-seven years 
and had two grown children. The wife, a homemaker, never 
worked during the marriage and had no vocational skills. Her hus­
band had been paying her $25,000 per year, but she claimed she 
needed $68,000. The husband was employed by a family corpora­
tion which paid him $50,000 a year as a salary. In addition, his 
unearned income was $38,000 yearly. The husband's net worth was 
over $1,000,000. His assets included: agency accounts, bank ac­
counts, joint interest in Canadian real estate, joint interest in the 
marital home, forty percent ownership in a personal holding com­
pany, various insurance policies, and annual gifts from parents of 
$6,000. The judge entered the following judgment in favor of the 
wife: (a) Husband's interest in marital home to wife (value: $45,000); 
(b) husband's interest in Canadian real estate to wife (his contribu­
tion was $10,000); (c) $25,000 in cash to wife; (d) two agency accounts 
to wife (approximate value $330,000); (e) $30,000 per year support 
payment to wife; (f) status as irrevocable beneficiary for full face 
value of nine insurance policies (value: approximately $80,000); and 
(g) $7,500 to wife's counsel. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that the 
judge's court order was not plainly wrong or excessive. The case 
has been considered by some as the most liberal property division 
implementing section 34. 
In order for the statute to work effectively, a lawyer's duty to 
his client should encompass the same effort in applying the sec­
tion's standards as that of a trial judge. This is especially true when 
the spouses, through their attorneys, have reached an agreement, 
which they plan to submit to the court to be included in and be 
made part of the court's judgment. Each element is critical in de­
termining a fair allocation of the property. 
Probate judges differ in their views on the importance of 
"fault" in assigning property. Except in extreme cases, fault should 
not play an important role in such an equitable award. On the 
other hand, acts which cause the plaintiff such injury, trauma, or 
other serious mental or physical impairment as would shock the 
senses of a reasonable person should be considered. However, allo­
171. Rice v. Rice, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 787,361 N.E.2d 1305, 1307. 
172. Id. 
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cations of property on the basis of fault are in the nature of a pen­
alty, and, as a result, should not be considered unless the fault is 
clear cut and extreme. In any event, fault, no matter how extreme, 
is only one of the many factors mandated for consideration by sec­
tion 34.173 
An important element of the new section permits a plaintiff to 
request alimony or transfer of property "upon motion in an action 
brought at any time after the divorce."174 A section 34 action after 
divorce, however, is available only when a judgment for alimony or 
assignment of property has neither been requested nor entered 
previously.175 If a judgment for alimony or assignment of property 
has been entered, statute section 37 provides jurisdiction for 
modification of the preexisting judgment. 176 Section 37 provides 
only for modification of alimony, not for modification of assignment 
of property. The fact that section 37 fails to provide for modifica­
tion of property assignments is especially logical, particularly when 
one considers that one of the functions of property assignment is to 
effect as full and complete a settlement of property rights between 
the parties as is possible. 
Recently, the Massachusetts General Laws have been 
amended so as to allow a court to require sufficient security for the 
payment of alimony. Additionally, any subsequent modification 
may also require such security,177 
VII. TAX IMPLICATIONS 
Although recent tax reform has made some drastic changes on 
a taxpayer's income tax return, the general tax implications affect­
ing alimony and separate support, whether under divorce, separate 
17S Asupport, or written separation agreement, remain the same. 
spouse must include in his or her gross income any periodic pay­
ments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received in dis­
charge of a legal obligation which the paying spouse has made by 
virtue of his or her marital or family relationship.179 These pay­
ments are deductible by the paying spouse. 1SO 
173. See note 164 supra. 
174. See note 162 supra. 
175. See Inker, Walsh, & Perrochi, supra note 162, at 21. 
176. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 37 (West Supp. 1978). 
177. See id. § 36. 
178. See I.R.C. §§ 71, 152,215. 
179. I.R.C. § 7l(a)(I). 
180. I.R.C. § 215(a). Because I.R.C. § 62(13) allows this deduction in arriving at 
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Periodic payments do not include installment payments of a 
property settlement, the principal sum of which is, either in terms 
of money or property, specified in the judgment, instrument, or 
agreement. lSl If, however, the principal sum is to be paid over a 
period of more than ten years from the date of such judgment, 
instrument, or agreement, then the installment payments shall be 
treated as periodic payments. They are included in the payee 
spouse's income and deductible by the payor spouse to the extent 
that in any taxable year such payments do not exceed ten percent 
of the principal sum. lS2 
Payments which are solely in support of minor children are 
not includable in the receiving spouse's income nor deductible by 
adjusted gross income, the paying spouse may take the deduction irrespective of the 
zero bracket amount described in l.R.C. § 63. 
181. l.R.C. § 7l(c)(1). The new approach to property assignments set forth 
in MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1978), discussed at notes 162-77 
supra and accompanying text, has not altered the tax treatment of property settle­
ments. When one spouse assigns property to the other, either by court order or by 
agreement, the assignment is viewed as being in consideration of the other spouse's 
relinquishment of his or her marital rights. The transfer is treated as a sale and the 
assignor-spouse realizes a gain on the transfer to the extent that the fair market value 
of the property at the time of the divorce exceeds the assignor's adjusted basis. This 
is the familiar rule of United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). The rationale is that 
the transfer is an even exchange of property for marital rights. 
New property assignment laws tend to ignore the old concepts of marital rights 
and alimony. Many of these laws look instead exclusively to the respective contribu­
tions of each spouse when fashioning an equitable division of the property acquired 
during the marriage. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1976). Con­
ceptually, settlements under these statutes are not exchanges at all. Rather, the divi­
sion of property attempts to allocate to each party that which they already own based 
on their contribution to acquisition. Such a division is not a taxable event under the 
Davis rule. For a fuller explanation of the conceptual considerations, statutory va­
riations, and relevant case law, see Comment, The Federal Income Tax Consequences 
of Property Settlements in Common Law States and Under the Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act: A Proposal, 29 ME. L. REV. (1977). 
The Massachusetts property assignment statute does not merit this different tax 
treatment for two reasons. First, it retains many of the alimony or marital rights 
criteria as factors that must be considered by the probate court. See note 169 supra. 
The statute incorporates the contribution or partnership criteria only as optional 
factors for the 'court to consider. See note 170 supra. Second, the statute does not 
segregate property acquired after the marriage. It therefore does not adopt the con­
tribution and partnership approach to such an extent that the assignment warrants 
different tax treatment. Under Davis, then, a property assignment under MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 remains a taxable event. 
182. l.R.C. § 7l(c)(2). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3) (1960) which treats 
payments over a lO-year or less period as periodic, even though the sum is set forth 
in the decree, if the payments are subject to certain contingencies and are in the 
nature ofalimony or support. 
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the paying spouse. 183 If the payment is for both spouse and minor 
child, without specifically saying how much is for the spouse and 
how much for the child, the entire payment is treated as though 
made to the spouse and therefore taxable to that spouse and deduc­
tible by the paying spouse. 184 
If a child receives over half of her support from her parents, 
the parent having custody of the child for over half of the calender 
year is entitled to take the dependent exemption for that child. 18s 
This general rule, however, is subject to two important exceptions. 
The first exception applies where a written decree or agreement 
provides that the parent not having custody shall be entitled to 
claim the exemption and that parent contributed at least $600 for 
the support of the child. 18s The second exception allows a parent 
not having custody for the required time, but who has provided over 
$1200 for a child's support, to take the exemption unless the parent 
having custody can "clearly establish" that he or she provided more 
for the support of the child than did the parent not having cus­
tody.187 
In determining alimony and support, consideration must be 
given to the tax impact on both spouses in order for the court to 
allocate the maximum amount of money for the greatest possible 
benefit. Tax avoidance planning is an important part of every family 
law practitioner's efforts, and a failure to understand the tax impli­
cations of a judgment or the tax impact on the client might subject 
the lawyer to disciplinary action. 188 
183. I.R.C. § 71(b). 
184. I.R.C. § 71(a); Treas. Reg. § l.71-1(e) (1960). See also Commissioner v. 
Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961). 
185. I.R.C: § 152(e)(1). I.R.C. § 152(e)(1)(A) requires that the child receive more 
than half of his support from his parents. 
186. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(A). 
187. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(B). This exception is important because it allows a pa­
rent to take an exemption even though no exemption provision was made in a writ­
ten agreement or even if a contrary provision was made. Treas. Reg. § l.152-4(d)(3) 
(1971). Once the noncustodial parent establishes that he or she has provided $1200 
or more for child support, the custodial parent has the burden of establishing "by a 
clear preponderance of the evidence" that he or she has provided more support than 
the noncustodial parent. Id. 
1~8. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 6, Disciplinary 
Rule 6-101(A)(1). See also Freedman, Guideline for Alimony and Support Orders, 
19 B.B.J., May 1975, at 3. 
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VIII. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Court Reorgainzation Bill 
Recently, the Massachusetts Legislature has passed Senate 
Bill #1322,189 commonly referred to as "The Court Reorganization 
Bill." The new law, as broad as it is, does little if anything to change 
the substance of family law within Massachusetts. It focuses, rather, 
on terminology changes, procedural changes, and most important, 
structural changes that will increase the effectiveness of the judicial 
branch of government. For example, there is no longer a "probate 
court." The correct appellation now is "Probate Department of the 
Trial Court, Worcester Division."19o There are no longer any "pro­
bate judges." They are now called "associate justices of the trial 
court." Of greater importance, however, is the statute's effect upon 
the ability to allocate judicial manpower among the various depart­
ments of the trial court. This may now be done on the basis of need, 
without regard to the strictures or limitations of the prior court 
structure. 
B. Statute Protecting Persons Suffering Fr01n Abuse 
Another significant change brought about recently by the legis­
lature will have an important effect on the daily practice of family 
law; 1978 Mass. Acts chapter 447 ostensibly affects persons suffer­
ing from abuse. 191 In fact, the act will affect policemen, lawyers, 
189. 1978 Mass. Acts ch. 478. 
190. In Massachusetts there are 14 divisions of the "probate department." 
191. The new act is set forth in 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 448 (West) as follows: 
Chap. 447. 	 AN ACT PROVIDING CERTAIN TEMPORARY PROTECTION FOR 
PERSONS SUFFERING ABUSE. 
Be it enacted, etc., as follows: 
SECTION 1. Chapter 208 of the General Laws is hereby amended by inserting 
after section 34B the following section: 
Section 34C. Whenever a court issues an order to vacate the marital home under 
section thirty-four B, or an order prohibiting a person from imposing any restraint on 
the personal liberty of another person under section eighteen and section thirty-two 
of chapter two hundred and nine, and an order under chapter two hundred and nine 
A, the register shall transmit a copy of each order forthwith to the appropriate local 
law enforcement agency. Law enforcement agencies shall establish procedures 
adequate to insure that an officer at the scene of an alleged violation of such order 
may be informed of the existence and terms of such order. Law officers shall use 
every reasonable means to enforce such orders. 
Any violation of the aforementioned orders shall be a misdemeanor, which shall 
be punished by a fine of no more than five thousand dollars or by imprisonme~t for 
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not more than two and one half years in a house of correction, or both. The court 
shall immediately notify the defendant of the issuance of each order and every order 
issued shall bear the following language: 
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. 
SECTION 2. The General Laws are hereby amended by inserting after chapter 
209 the following chapter: 
CHAPTER 209A. 
ABUSE PREVENTION. 
Section 1. The following words as used in this chapter shall have the following 
meanings: 
"Abuse", the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or 
household members: 
(a) attempting to cause or causing physical harm; 
(b) placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm; 
(c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat of 
force or duress. 
"Court", the superior, probate or district courts. 
"Family or household member", household member, a spouse, former spouse or 
their minor children or blood relative. 
"Law officer", any officer authorized to serve criminal process. 
Section 2. Proceedings under this chapter shall be filed, heard and determined 
in the district, superior court or the probate court of the county in which the plaintiff 
resides. If the plaintiff has left the residence or household to avoid abuse, he shall 
have the option to bring an action in the county of the previous residence or house­
hold or the new residence or household. 
Section 3. A person suffering from abuse from an adult or minor family or 
household member may file a petition in the district, probate or superior court re­
questing any order which will protect him from abuse, including, but not limited to 
the following: 
(a) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff, whether the de­
fendant is an adult or minor; 
(b) ordering the defendant to vacate forthwith the household; 
(c) awarding the plaintiff in the case of husband or wife temporary custody of a 
minor; 
(d) ordering the defendant to pay temporary support for the plaintiff or any child 
in the plaintiff's custody, or both, when the defendant has a legal obligation to sup­
port such person; 
(e) ordering the defendant to pay to the person abused monetary compensation 
for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse. Compensatory losses shall include, 
but not be limited to, loss of earnings or support, out-of-pocket losses for injuries 
sustained, moving expenses and reasonable attorney fees. 
No filing fee shall be charged for such a petition. 
Any relief granted by the court shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed 
one year, at the expiration of which time the court may extend any order, upon mo­
tion of the plaintiff, for such additional time as it deems necessary to protect the 
plaintiff from abuse. The court may modify its order at any subsequent time upon 
motion by either party. 
No order under this chapter shall in any manner affect title to any real property. 
Any proceedings under this chapter shall not preclude any other available civil 
or criminal remedies. 
Section 4. Upon the filing of a petition under this chapter, the court may enter 
such temporary orders as it deems necessary to protect a plaintiff from abuse, includ­
ing relief as provided in section eighteen and section thirty-four B of chapter two 
hundred and eight and section thirty-two of chapter two hundred and nine. 
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If the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of 
abuse, the court may enter such temporary order without notice as it deems neces­
sary to protect the plaintiff. The court shall immediately thereafter notify the defen­
dant and give him an opportunity to be heard as soon as possible, but not schedule 
the hearing later than five days after such order is entered on the question of con­
tinuing such temporary order. 
Section 5. When the court is unavailable after the close of business at the end of 
the week, a petition may be filed before any available district court justice who may 
grant relief to the plaintiff under section three upon cause shown in an ex parte 
proceeding. Immediate and present danger of abuse to the plaintiff shall constitute 
cause for purposes of this section. 
Any order issued under this section shall terminate as of the close of business on 
the next day the court is in session. 
Any order issued under this section and any documentation in support thereof 
shall be certified immediately by the clerk of the district court to the court. Such 
certification to the court shall have the effect of commencing proceedings under this 
chapter and invoking the other provisions of this chapter. 
Section 6. Whenever any law officer has reason to believe that a family or 
household member has been abused, that officer shall use all reasonable means to 
prevent further abuse, including: (1) remaining on the scene as long as there is a 
danger to the physical safety of such person without the presence of a law officer, 
including but not limited to staying in the dwelling unit; (2) assisting such person in 
obtaining medical treatment necessitated by an assault, including driving the victim 
to the emergency room of the nearest hospital; (3) giving such person immediate and 
adequate notice of his rights; (4) arresting the person if the officer has probable 
cause to believe that a felony has been committed, or a misdemeanor has been com­
mitted in the officer's presence, or a misdemeanor has been committed pursuant to 
section thirty-four C of chapter two hundred and eight. Said notice shall consist of 
handing such person a copy of the following statement written in English and 
Spanish, and reading the same to such person: 
"You have the right to go to the district, probate or superior court and file a 
complaint requesting any of the following applicable orders for temporary relief: (a) 
an order restraining your attacker from abusing you; (b) an order directing your at­
tacker to leave your household; (c) an order awarding you custody of a minor child; 
and (d) an order directing your attacker to pay support for you or any minor child in 
your custody if the attacker has a legal obligation to support them; (e) an order di­
recting your attacker to pay you for losses suffered as a result of the abuse, including 
medical and moving expenses, loss of earnings or support, attorney fees and other 
out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained. 
You have the right to go to district court and file a criminal complaint for threats, 
assault and battery, assault with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to kill or other 
related crimes. You may go to district court for an emergency on weekends or holi­
days. 
If you are in need of medical treatment, you have the right to demand that the 
officer present drive you to the nearest hospital or otherwise assist you. 
If you believe that police protection is needed for your physical safety, you have 
the right to demand that the officer present remain at the scene until you and your 
children can leave or until your safety is otherwise insured." 
SECTION 3. Section 120 of chapter 266 of the General Laws is hereby amended 
by striking out the first sentence and inserting in place thereof the following two 
sentences:-Whoever, without right, enters or remains in or upon the dwelling 
house, buildings, boats or improved or enclosed land, wharf, or pier of another, after 
haVing been forbidden so to do by the person who has lawful control of said prem­
ises, either directly or by notice posted thereon, or in violation of a court order pur­
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almost all departments of the trial court, spouses, children, judges 
and chief judges. The act took effect on August 16, 1978, and its 
suant to section thirty-four B of chapter two hundred and eight or section four of 
chapter two hundred and nine A, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one 
hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or both. Proof that 
a court has given notice of such a court order to the 'alleged offender shall be prima 
facie evidence that the notice requirement of this section has been met. 
SECTION 4. Section 28 of chapter 276 of the General Laws is hereby amended 
by striking out the first sentence and inserting in place thereof the following 
sentence:-Any officer authorized to serve criminal process may arrest without the 
issuance of a warrant and detain a person found by him in the act of stealing prop­
erty in his presence regardless of the value of the property stolen and may arrest 
without warrant and detain a person whom he has probable cause to believe has 
committed a misdemeanor under section thirty-four C of chapter two hundred and 
eight. Said officer may arrest and detain a person charged with a misdemeanor, with­
out having a warrant for such arrest in his possession, if the officer making such 
arrest and detention shall have actual knowledge that a warrant then in full force and 
effect for the arrest of such person has in fact issued. 
SECTION 5. Said chapter 276 is hereby amended by inserting after section 42 
the following section:­
Section 42A. Whenever a court issues a criminal complaint and the crime in­
volves assault and battery, trespass, threat to commit a crime, nonsupport, or any 
other complaint which involves the infliction, or the imminent threat of infliction, of 
physical harm upon a person by such person's family or household member as de­
fined in section one of chapter two hundred and nine A, the court may, in lieu of or 
in addition to any terms of personal recognizance, and after a hearing and finding, 
impose such terms as will insure the safety of the person allegedly suffering the 
physical abuse or threat thereof, and will prevent its recurrence. 
Such terms and conditions shall include reasonable restrictions on the travel, 
association or place of abode of the defendant as will prevent such person from con­
tact with the person abused. 
As part of the disposition of any criminal complaint, the court may establish such 
terms and conditions of probation as will insure the safety of the person who has 
suffered such abuse or threat thereof, and will prevent the recurrence of such abuse 
or threat thereof. 
Such terms and conditions shall include reasonable restrictions on the travel, 
association or place of abode of the defendant as will prevent such person from 'all 
contact with the person abused; or the payment by the defendant to the person 
abused of monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of the crime. 
Compensatory loss shall include, but not be limited to; loss of earnings or support, 
out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained, moving expenses and reasonable attorneys 
fees. 
In addition, the terms and conditions of either the probation or the disposition of 
the complaint may include, but not be limited to, referral of the defendant to a clinic, 
facility or professional for one or more examinations, diagnoses, counseling or treat­
ment; requiring the defendant to report periodically to a probation officer; or release 
of the defendant to the custody of a residential treatment facility. 
SECTION 6. The chief justice of the superior court and the chief judge of the 
probate court and the chief justice of the district courts shall jOintly promulgate a 
form of petition for chapter two hundred and nine A of the General Laws, inserted 
by section one of this act, which shall be simple and permit a person to file a peti­
tion himself. 
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provisions will certainly be discussed and litigated192 in the months 
to come. It provides that any person who suffers abuse from a fam­
ily or household member may petition the district, probate, or 
superior departments of the trial court for an order of protection. 
Such relief may include, but is not necessarily limited to, an order 
to vacate, a temporary change of custody of children, an order for 
temporary support, damages, or a restraining order. 193 
One can readily see that the jurisdiction of the district de­
partment of the trial court is greatly expanded. Although the relief 
under this section may be granted for no longer than one year, this 
limitation may be extended for good cause shown. Moreover, the 
court may modify its order at any subsequent time on motion by 
either party. 194 
The new statute goes on to provide: "Any proceeding under 
this chapter shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal 
remedies. "195 The implications of this phrase are unclear. At the 
very least there will be some confusing overlapping among the 
three departments of the trial court. On the other hand, this stat­
ute might be the catalyst needed to force some members of the 
bar out of a quagmire of rigidly defined jurisdictional rules among 
the various courts. Mter all, there is now only one trial court. 
Police officers will be directly affected by the act. Whenever a 
law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a family or 
household member has been abused, he is empowered under the 
statute to use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse. In 
addition to remaining on the scene to protect the person suffering 
from abuse and assisting in obtaining any necessary medical treat­
ment, the officer is specifically given the authority to arrest "if the 
officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been com­
mitted, or a misdemeanor has been committed in the officer's pres­
ence, or a lnisdemeanor has been committed pursuant to section 
thirty four C of chapter two hundred and eight. "196 
The police officer has the apparent right to arrest without a 
warrant a person charged with a misdemeanor even under circum­
192. Several arguments militate in favor of the statute's repeal or modification. 
Many provisions are vague in certain areas regarding adequate police protection and 
enforcement of sanctions. Some of the provisions, in particular those dealing with 
arrest and double jeopardy, may not'withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
193. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (1978). See note 191 supra SECTION 2. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6 (1978) (emphasis added). See note 191 
supra SECTIONS 1 & 2. 
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stances where the misdemeanor was not committed in the officer's 
presence. 197 Another section of the new statute specifically gives 
the police officer authority to arrest without a warrant if the officer 
has probable cause to believe a misdemeanor has been committed 
under section 34C of chapter 208, or if he or she has actual knowl­
edge that a warrant then in full force and effect for the arrest of 
such person has in fact been issued. 198 
Other potential problems exist. The district department of the 
trial court, by the express terms of this statute, may now enter into 
many areas of family law previously reserved to the probate court. 
What the outcome will be, whether the statute or some provisions 
thereof can withstand a constitutional test,199 how it will be ad­
ministered by various judges who have no training in family law, 
all are questions that soon must be answered. 
197. See text accompanying note 196 supra. 
198. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 276, § 28 (1978). See note 191 supra SECTION 4. 
199. See note 192 supra. 
